

The Army Force Stabilization Implementation Plan

Prepared By

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1.0 GENERAL

"Sustained engagement of our Army will be the norm, not the exception. How do we man the Army in a way that provides cohesive, high performing units in this reality of continuous engagement?" General Peter J. Schoomaker, Arrival Message, August 1, 2003

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this plan is to provide direction to the Major Commands (MACOM) and Army Staff (ARSTAF) for the implementation of Army-wide Force Stabilization (FS) systems and other changes required for the personnel support of the Army Posture of Engagement requirements for Unit Rotation. This document makes the case for change, provides an overview of the manning models, and provides detailed direction for the implementation of FS. The mission will change the manning posture of the Army, and will enhance the performance of units. In short, this plan:

- Identifies what needs to be done;
- Provides guidance on how to get it done;
- Fixes responsibility for who will do it;
- Establishes timelines and priorities for getting it completed.

This plan serves as the vehicle to facilitate changes necessary to transition the Army to FS manning systems within a Unit Rotation environment. Subsequently, the plan will be supplemented by supporting action plans as required in the several tasks outlined in later chapters. The current individual replacement system (IRS) and the assignment policies that support it create excessive turbulence, which in turn erodes unit level cohesion, requires significant effort (Stop Move/Loss) to prepare a unit for deployment, builds units with too many non-deployable Soldiers, and engenders instability. Current forces require Stop Move/Loss to build to effective levels for the current operations. The FS manning system changes are a major action in direct support of the overall transformation of the Army.

The Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), oversaw the effort to design a Stabilization manning system that would slow down, stabilize and settle the force. Then a model of Unit Focused Stabilization (UFS), that aligns Soldier assignments to the unit operational cycle, is overlaid on top of Stabilization for some MTOE units. The two major systems covered in this paper UFS (developed by the G-1), and Unit Rotation (UR) being developed by the DCS, G-3, have different "points of friction" that conflict with several of the Army's current policies and practices. The Army's personnel system is complex and individual-centric, so changes are required to focus current personnel and leader development policies to be unit-centric. The impacts of the Stabilization, UFS, and UR systems on the Army reach beyond the personnel system, to include force structure and the new modularity initiatives, training, infrastructure, and power projection. Therefore, major impacts are being identified early

in the process and coordinated across the ARSTAF and with TRADOC in order to mitigate their effects. When implementing major Army-wide changes to the personnel system, careful consideration must be given to balancing the requirements of Stabilization, UFS, and UR programs with Soldiers, readiness, and funds.

The environment that the Army faces in the immediate future will require recurring deployments of short duration, eliminating time on arrival in the AOR for “build-up and training.” It is the Army’s training doctrine to move to a standard of “Train, Alert, Deploy, and fight on arrival,” rather than the current approach of “Alert, Train, Deploy, Train, then fight.” As FS is implemented, it is critical that the transformed maneuver units be manned with Soldiers and officers who have trained and remain together, so that they can be deployed and enter a fighting situation with little added preparation. Current Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demand that the Army not wait for full Transformation to implement the Stabilization, UFS, and UR systems. Implementation of these three initiatives must be accomplished as quickly as possible with the current force. Today, the Army is determined to design, develop, and man units to build on the intrinsic value of cohesion as a combat multiplier.

1.2 Background

On 18 October 2002, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) established a Unit Manning Task Force (UMTF) with the mission of completing the following four tasks:

1. Review previous attempts at Unit Manning;
2. Recommend a conceptual framework for a Unit Manning System;
3. Recommend courses of action;
4. Prepare an implementation plan.

In this charter, the VCSA provided the following guidance:

“ . . . at a minimum, the UMTF is to address the types and sizes of units to Unit Man vs. continue with the IRS (IRS), determine the feasible and acceptable lengths for building, training, employing and certifying units while ensuring leader development of officers and enlisted Soldiers, identify the necessary changes to policy, regulations, laws, processes and the implications of these changes and finally identify how the future readiness system will support this or be changed.”

Subsequently, on 17 December 2002, the former Secretary of the Army, Mr. White, directed a comprehensive and coherent initiative to transform policies and programs affecting all categories of Army manpower and personnel. As the primary initiative, the Secretary of the Army directed that OCONUS realignment of units (Posture of Engagement) be used to accelerate Unit Manning with the idea that this will drive other changes throughout the eight personnel Lifecycle functions (i.e., recruitment to retirement). In support of Unit Manning, the former Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, made the decision on 1 May 2003 that the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in Alaska would be the “first” unit to be manned under the Lifecycle Manning (LM)


system. Subsequent SBCTs, such as the 2CR and 2/25 INF, will also be Lifecycle Manned.

General Schoomaker, the current Chief of Staff, designated Unit Manning in September 2003 as a focus area in which he desired immediate attention and action. Nine of the focus areas, including Unit Manning, were placed under the operational control of the Commanding General, TRADOC. The UMTF was re-designated as Task Force Stabilization (TFS), and directed to review its previous work and provide recommendations for updating our manning system to increase unit readiness, deployability, and cohesion while improving stability and predictability for Soldiers and families. Unit readiness and deployability became the primary focus, while cohesion, stability, and predictability remain important. Hence, UMTF changed its name and emphasis to Stabilization.

The Task Force's challenge was to create a manning system that could meet the challenges and complexities of today's operational environment, while providing a successful framework for manning the Future Force. To do this, the Task Force built an array of options for an adaptable manning system that can be adjusted to meet the changing conditions of the world – sustaining what is best about the current system while at the same time shaping itself for the future. Thus, the critical component would be the desired ends, not the specific operating mechanisms to achieve them. The design problem was to identify what elements of the manning system should change to better achieve these objective characteristics. Whatever changes the Task Force members considered, they had to address the system-wide impact of these changes.

On 7 November 2003, the TFS received conceptual approval from the CSA for a program of Force Stabilization (FS). Under the aegis of this program, TFS received approval to establish a Stabilization manning system for CONUS installations. The CSA further approved combining the LM and Cyclic manning (CM) models into a Unit Focused Stabilization (UFS) manning system. Stabilization implementation was approved to begin in 4th quarter, FY 2004. The chart below provides an overview of the flexible methods tailored for building and sustaining units. Stabilization is an installation manning strategy. As such there will be UFS units located on a Stabilization installation. When they are integrated, they form the totality of Force Stabilization:

The Manning Systems of Force Stabilization



1.3 Why Force Stabilization – Unit Cohesion and Unit Level Readiness

For centuries, armies throughout the world have studied the art of fighting wars and certain principles consistently come to the front. One of these is that men who go into battle and fight as cohesive teams always produce better results. S.L.A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* provides a detailed study on cohesion and "why" men fight in combat. He concluded that men fight because of the moral strength that they draw from other men in the unit. The stronger the bond between Soldiers, the better the performance on the battlefield. A recent study ("Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War," Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, Wong, Kolditz, et al, July 2003) from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom strongly reinforces Marshall's finding, and also indicates that ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy are important factors in combat motivation within the Soldiers of the current professional, volunteer Army.

The Army faces a wide range of threats in very complex operating environments. We must maintain combat readiness as our primary focus while transitioning to a more agile, versatile, lethal, and survivable Army. To prepare for the future, the Army must develop full-spectrum forces capable of quickly adapting to both new challenges and unexpected circumstances. In many areas, this will transform the Army and Soldiers in how we think, train, and fight. Full-spectrum forces must be highly cohesive teams, whose shared experiences and intensive training enable them to perform better in combat, accomplishing highly demanding tasks in a dangerous and stressful environment. Turbulence in units, caused by the IRS, is the natural enemy of cohesion, readiness, and deployability. It robs our teams of the stability necessary to achieve higher levels of collective training. Given the Army's changing environment, there are essentially four reasons to initially stabilize the force through Stabilization and begin UFS of our Brigade Combat Teams: 1) reduce turbulence (improve cohesion, stability, and predictability), 2) develop new modularized BCTs, 3) conduct transformation to Units of Action (UA), and 4) implement Unit Rotations in accordance with the Posture of Engagement. First, the foundation of the FS system is increasing unit readiness and cohesion by decreasing personnel turbulence. Reduced turbulence supports Army leaders in building high performing, deployable teams. Second, the complexity and lengthy timelines associated with transforming current maneuver brigades to UAs require personnel stability to maximize unit and Army level benefits. Finally, the current IRS does not adequately support rotating units.

Unit Cohesion and Readiness

The Army has made several attempts over the past 100 years at designing and developing units that will remain together, become more stable, and build cohesion to improve their combat effectiveness. None have proven successful due to several factors. One of the most obvious of these is that the Army has looked for a *breadth of experience* from its officers and NCOs rather than developing a *depth of experience*. This situation was accepted because of the system that required officers and NCOs with specific experience and talents to move from MTOE units to serve in a growing number

of requirements in the institutional Army. These jobs were important, but they reduced the time that was available for Soldiers to serve in tactical units. This was complicated by the policy of individual equity for all officers of a specific branch. In actuality, the system was paying Soldiers a tremendous disservice as they saw the individuals who had trained them leave while they stayed on to break in someone new who was not ready to “hit the ground running.” In the current environment of the Posture of Engagement, units will be deploying for short periods, and will have to be ready to “hit the ground running.” This is the major purpose of the cohesive units developed through FS.

The recent performance of units of the 3ID in Iraq is a good example of what can be achieved by building a cohesive unit. The 3ID was deployed in October 2002 and members stabilized in their jobs. They trained intensively in the desert for some time before they actually entered Iraq. During this time, tank crews trained together; no programmed losses. Infantry teams trained together; again, no programmed losses. Combined arms maneuvers were initiated in which the units that trained together stayed together. When they finally hit the Line of Departure, Soldiers had confidence in how their teammates were going to react and fight. Deployed Teams had maximized unit strengths by minimizing individual weaknesses. Succession that might be required from combat losses was ingrained. They had developed a special kind of willingness to fight for each other, to risk death or severe wounds for their comrades that transcended all challenges. Their performance was magnificent. They rewrote the book on mechanized operations. However, it was strictly situational, as they “happened” to be deployed early, were forced by “stop move/loss” to remain together, and had the time and aggressive leadership to hone their training and skills. Army elements of the future may not enjoy this “preparation” time when they deploy. UFS builds units that have the same preparation and cohesion as the 3ID only before they deploy in harm’s way.

Stability and Predictability

The Army’s operational and deployment tempos are arguably higher than they have been in over 50 years. Over 320,000 Soldiers are currently serving at overseas locations, and Soldiers are spending longer periods away from home stations. Turbulence in units continues to rise as the Army grapples with balancing Soldier and family desires against unit strength, manning, promotions, and deployment needs. The first step to implementing a successful new manning initiative is to “slow the force down.” The Army moves people to fill priority OCONUS requirements, from 12 to 36 months. As major portions of the maneuver force return to CONUS, that will help reduce turbulence. However, our CONUS culture promotes a tour as 36-months with numerous Soldier-friendly exceptions, for schools, recruiting, RC advisor, Drill SGT, etc. that have set the tone for creating vacancies that in turn require a cascading series of moves. Although the Army cannot control the number of deployments it must undertake, it can influence the number of moves that it makes due to its culture. The Army must implement a manning system that, after initially slowing down the force, (Stabilization) creates more effective combat units, (UFS) while increasing the sense of stability and predictability for Soldiers and families, despite the increased tempo that it

currently faces. This problem is even more acute since this increased tempo is more likely to be the norm in the future than the exception.

Fielding the Future Force

Recent warfare in OIF and OEF has taken on a new level of complexity. The Future Force will transition modularized BCTs and their associated Headquarters elements into of Units of Action (UA) and Units of Employment (UE) fighting with new weapon systems and tactics. In the Future Force, the entire unit, every crew and leader, must operate from a common relevant operating picture or plan (CROP)—one team. UFS becomes essential for two reasons. First, though the Army is accelerating some of the new equipment, fielding the new UA will be a complex transition process. If Soldiers are constantly arriving and departing under the IRS, the unit will never reach a required high level of training proficiency. The UFS will stabilize Soldiers in these units to enhance training and performance using the new doctrine and equipment. Second, if the force is not stabilized under a UFS system, the Army will not be able to field the UAs, and still be able to provide the number of combat ready units to support the National Military Strategy (NMS).

As a result, The Army is initiating FS in the 4th quarter, FY 04, by emphasizing the basic concepts of keeping Soldiers and officers together longer on all installations and in specified MTOE units. Stabilization at all CONUS installations will precede the implementation of a full FS, but when completed will enable the Army to fulfill its Joint, expeditionary, rapid deployment role in the National Posture of Engagement with highly trained, immediately responsive units. UFS will continue with those units that are part of the Army Transformation such as the SBCTs and the forthcoming modularized BCTs (that will in fact become UAs). For the remaining units, UFS will be carefully initiated commencing in the 1st quarter, FY 05. Stabilizing the force enhances the capability to redesign the Army through current to future modularity efforts. Similarly, modularity structure changes, supported by NET/NOT will be scheduled around operational commitments and UFS will be tied/synchronized to support modularity. Linking the timing of modularity efforts to NET and UFS will further minimize non-available unit (down) time.

1.4 Scope of Change

Force Stabilization

Successful implementation of Stabilization and subsequent LM or CM requires changes across a broad range of functional areas extending well beyond the traditional personnel arena. In order to illustrate the full scope of proposed changes that must be considered, some of the impacts on current systems and procedures caused by stabilizing a large portion of the force are outlined below. Attention to and resolution of changes in these areas will require an integrated analysis:

Stabilization and Unit Focused Stabilization

- Personnel policies and related issues—rules based on Army-wide equity:

- Command tours
- Summer rotation cycle
- Promotion from LT to CPT (TIS/TIG)
- Advancement from PVT through SGT
- Reenlistment for other than current unit of assignment
- Stabilization rules
- Replacement system
- Assignment system and procedures
- Accession and recruiting process
- Grade substitution
- Reclassification
- Selective Reenlistment Bonus
- Individual Personnel actions
- Special assignment programs (e.g., Exceptional Family Member Program, Married Army Couples Program)
- Personnel procedures—procedures to support individual system
- Readiness rating system (AR 220-1)—metrics based on numerically measured, monthly snapshot strength levels
- MOS management—maintaining fixed level of manning for each MOS
- Distribution guidance—requirements to sustain much of the Army at high fixed levels
- Force structure—build units with consideration for sustainability
- Authorization documentation process IT support systems—current systems designed to manage one individual at a time, not groups
- Leader development—multiple, progressive assignments to gain depth of experience
- Professional Military Education—availability for OES, WOES, and NCOES
- Institutional Army—supportability of TDA Army requirements
- Recruiting cycles—surge of output requirements
- Training cycles—surges in requirements and training capacities
- Culture change—depth of experience versus breadth of experience
- Modernization—synchronizing changes around the unit's operational cycle
- Housing-increased number of units to support Stabilization and LM units
- Supply accountability—maintaining accountability of equipment as units turnover
- In/out processing—creating capacity to surge community resources

Unit Deployment/Rotation

- Personnel policies—policy changes unique unit rotations (versus manning)

- Personnel procedures—procedures to support individual replacement system and procedures unique to rotating units
- Mission ready availability—length of time available to accomplish assigned missions
- PERSTEMPO—number of days Soldiers are away from home
- Morale—sustaining Soldier morale in spite of a higher deployment rate
- Installation support—expanding the capacity for community support
- Housing—increased number of units to support rotating units
- Well-Being—expand capabilities to better support Soldiers and families
- Equipment sustainment—maintaining equipment standards and repair part levels (contract maintenance and whether the equipment is drawn from prepositioned stocks)
- Modernization—synchronizing changes around the rotation cycle
- Training readiness—sustaining training levels pre- and post-rotation
- Soldier and Leader Development—availability for OES and NCOES

1.5 Force Stabilization Assumptions

To assist in the implementation of Stabilization and subsequently UFS (LM or CM), the following assumptions are provided:

General Army Assumptions

- TRADOC and Accessions Command can adjust to meet future needs
- Accessions will be able to sustain the Army's needs for FS units
- IRS will remain to support Stabilization and primarily for organizations other than UFS, units above Brigade level, and TDA.
- Resources are available to accommodate/support modularized BCTs at installations
- Scheduling of training and recruiting can be synchronized to support UFS timeline.
- “Managed readiness” is acceptable.
- Laws, policies, professional development, and career progression are subject to modification.
- Maximum pace for Brigade Combat Team(s): Lifecycle (Reset) 4/quarter – or - Cyclic 2-3/month, depending on future Modularity structure changes.

Stabilization Assumptions

- If initial assignment of either an officer or Soldier is to a CONUS installation designated as a Stabilization installation, they will remain at assigned location

until moved for the needs of the Army, their leader development, or their individual preference, in that priority.

- Total time at the Stabilization installation includes unaccompanied tour and/or deployment(s).
- UFS or other maneuver BCTs on Stabilization installations will rotate from and return to the installation.
- Attendance at selected Officer, Warrant Officer, and NCO professional military education (PME), will ideally be TDY and return. This may include PLDC, BNCOC, CCC, and WOAC.
- Predominant Re-enlistment option available at the initial reenlistment opportunity is PDA for three or more years. Other Re-enlistment options for designated specialty or STAR MOS may be approved.
- Movement to the institutional Army for Officers assigned to an MTOE unit will occur after command (or branch equivalent)
- After 36-48 month tours in the institutional Army, officers and NCOs will be encouraged to return back to the same unit or Stabilization installation for subsequent leadership tours
- ETS or PDA Reenlistments will be adjusted to facilitate deployment cycle
- UFS manning policies will take precedence over Stabilization manning policies
- IRS is the manning system employed under Stabilization.

Lifecycle and Cyclic Manning Assumptions

- All Stryker BCTs formed subsequent to the 172nd will transition to UFS as they are formed.
- The Army's newly modularized Brigade Combat Teams will transition to UFS first. Other specified BCTs and MTOE units will follow them. Selected TDA units will transition last. Army G-3 will designate units for transition. BCTs will also undergo modularization and eventually transformation to UA. (See Chart, page 27)
- The UFS manning model's normal unit cycle will be 36 months
- Brigades will be staggered within the division to:
 - Facilitate supportability by post infrastructure
 - Ensure two of three brigades certified deployable at all times. If number of brigades changes they will still be staggered to provide maximum number available at all times
- Korea and Europe units will not be Unit Focused or Stabilized in country; will follow after rotation initiated
- Modularity – modeled 3ID, 10MTN, and 101st AA (brigades will expand above current 3)
- Officers, NCOs, and Soldiers are stabilized for complete unit cycle
 - Absences for training and leader development minimized/eliminated

- Reenlistments, ETS, etc. are synchronized to cycle
- UFS policies must consider requirements for: Stabilization, UR, and Unit Transformation.
- The LM Model will be used primarily for fielding or transforming new units and converting the current 33 BCTs. The CM Model will be used as the primary sustainment model for units/organizations above Brigade level, and those whose Continuity of Operations is paramount.
- UFS will require “managed readiness.”

Deployment Assumptions

- Six-month average rotation (tours may be longer to OIF/OEF initially)
- UFS units may deploy up to 12 months during the 36-month lifecycle
- All UFS deployments are unaccompanied
- Deploying BCTs/UAs will be oriented on Joint hubs and overseas presence requirements
- Unit design standardization will facilitate deployment or habitual ties to rotation sites by like units
- FS (Stabilization and UFS) concept supports family Well-Being.

2.0 REVIEW AND CHANGE PROCESS

2.1 Guiding Principles

“To satisfy the recurring commitments anticipated in an Army at War, units must sustain a level of readiness that far exceeds the ability of an individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit readiness and combat effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families. To achieve them we will need to undertake the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army’s history.” An Army at War – A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, February 17, 2004.

The current personnel system is "equity based and individually oriented," resulting in "friction points" with any manning system that is "cohesion/stability based and unit oriented." To assist in the formulation of new policies, and revision of current ones, the following principles are provided, which include the recent guidelines from CSA. (See Section 2.3 and Annex B).

- Initial implementation of Stabilization will begin in 4th Quarter, FY 04, UFS continues to expand to more units 4th Quarter, FY 04
- Complement the Army’s Posture of Engagement and rotation based system
- Minimize individual replacements to units
- Develop an implementation plan for units in Korea and Europe (Consider regional-based manning system to fill overseas personnel requirements)
- Identify personnel, training, and professional development policies that inhibit Force Stabilization, provide solutions, and recommended changes NLT 15 March 04
- UFS implies “managed readiness”
- Determine how to get the best commanders in units. Do not consider individual equity, consider unit equity
- Create policies that increase stability, unit cohesion, and predictability in Soldiers’ lives.
- Prioritize attainment of “depth of experience,” rather than “breadth of experience” in young officers and NCOs
- Provide commanders latitude and flexibility, but with parameters
- Consider creating a new set of circumstances that neutralizes the FS or UR friction point (e.g., extend indefinite reenlistment to mid-termers, revise readiness reporting metrics)
- Do not diminish stability and readiness as a result of scheduling leader development and military schooling (e.g., program course attendance in synchronization with unit scheduled, periodic turbulence windows)
- Provide rules for commanders that increase the “range” of a policy, but still sets limits within stabilization goals (e.g., expand but limit grade substitution rules)

- Develop rules that do not require extraordinary management controls to implement (i.e., off-line management)
- Make conscious decision concerning which policies will not be changed as a result of FS (e.g., EFMP, selected separations under AR 635-200)
- Consider the impacts that FS policies will have on readiness, Soldiers, and the Military Personnel Account (MPA)
- Consider the "ripple" effect that new policies have on the total personnel lifecycle

2.2 Approach to Managing Review and Change

The primary approach is to leverage the body of knowledge and planning already completed by TFS. Implementation is accelerated by the initiatives outlined in this plan. Milestones are at Annex A, and repeated with appropriate Timelines after each of several task descriptions. The Force Stabilization Concept Plan was developed by the TRADOC Commander and TFS, and approved by the Army Chief of Staff. Major requirements now include the development and execution of actions outlined in this Implementation Plan. Subsequent planning will require design and execution of action plans among elements of the ARSTAF and subordinate elements.

To provide the organizational framework and guidance for this process, the Director, Directorate for Military Personnel Policy (DAPE-MP) in the Office of the DCS, G-1, serves as the implementing Director of the Army's FS initiative. Task Force Stabilization has been realigned into two complementary teams. TFS (DMPP) will ensure that policies and procedures are fully coordinated and modified, and the AR 600-XX is published and implemented. The second TFS team will become DCS Plans (HRC) and will operate under guidance from DMPP and will ensure that all policies are fully understood, translated into distribution events. After the results of performance measurements are analyzed and corrections are made, and in team with OPMD and EPMD, TFS (HRC) will ensure that FS is effectively implemented by the Army MACOMs. The Director, DAPE-MP is responsible for ensuring that all requirements of this plan are satisfied. In addition, the Director, Army Personnel Transformation Directorate (DAPE-PT), assists in the coordination and integration of FS requirements across the ARSTAF. In this role, DAPE-PT synchronizes, and integrates the transformation of the personnel system to Stabilization and UFS (LM or CM).

2.3 Establishing Policy Guidance for Force Stabilization

A Personnel Policy team has been established in DAPE-MP. They are assisted by TFS and will examine all personnel policies that may inhibit the implementation of FS. Further, the DAPE-MP team will coordinate with appropriate proponents in the ODOS, G-3 to review and resolve all policies for which G-3 is the proponent and that affect FS. There are a few critical policies that are the purview of the G-3 that impact on Stabilization and LM or CM, such as operation of individual augmentees and conduct of professional military education.

The list of Personnel Inhibitors provided at Annex B is the initial list of policy areas that are currently being examined to enable the operation of the three new manning systems of FS: Stabilization, LM, and CM. In addition, DAPE-MP will use the results of the modified policies to develop a new Army regulation, AR 600-XX (FS) to include sections on Stabilization, LM, and CM, as appropriate. See Section 2.4, below.

The Personnel Inhibitors (processes, or policies) have been aligned into four priority bands: *Critical, Essential, Sustaining, and Status Quo*. A specific listing of the 167 policies suggested for initial review is identified in Annex B.

Policy Timeline. The timeline for the DAPE-MP policy review team follows.

Policy Team Requirements	Start Review	Complete Staffing Packages; AR Revision	Complete Staffing of Policies	Final Approval of Policy Modifications
Critical and Essential Policies (31)	1 October 2003	15 February 2004	15 April 2004	15 July 2004
Sustainable and Status Quo Policies (136)	15 December 2003	1 May 2004	15 July 2004	30 September 2004

2.4 Documenting Change Requirements: Army Regulations

Approved changes must be documented in Army regulations and other source documents. A major mission is to "revise the policies." Specific requirements for policy review are discussed at Annex B. As a result of the Policy Review, changes (i.e., the new policy statements) must be documented in a revised source publication. This will be accomplished by development of a new Army Regulation 600-XX (FS). DAPE-MP, assisted by TFS and DAPE-PT will accomplish this task following the timeline below. This new AR will apply to the FS-designated units. In some instances, legislative changes must be worked through the Uniform Legislative and Budget Process (ULB). In order to provide a single reference guide for personnel managers and commanders at all levels; the revised regulation should contain the following Chapters and Sections as a minimum:

- Chapter 1: Introduction with Sections on: Purpose; References; and Responsibilities for: DCS, G-1; DCS, G-3; DCS, G-4; DCS, G-8; OCLL; CPA; TJAG; TSG; TRADOC
- Chapter 2: FS Overview to include Sections on Rationale; Concept of Stabilization to include subordinate sections on: Overview; Rules for Policies; Waiver/Exception Criteria. Major Section on Implementation Methodology.
- Chapter 3: Unit Focused Stability (LM) to include Sections on: Concept for LM; Overview of Phases; Rules for Policies; Waiver/Exception Criteria. Major Section on Implementation Methodology.

- Chapter 4: Unit Focused Stability (CM) to include Sections on: Concept for CM; Overview of Phases; Rules for Policies; Waiver/Exception Criteria. Major Section on Implementation Methodology.
- Other Chapters covering operational requirements in the areas of Training, Readiness, Deployment, Logistics and Housing, and Family Support Planning (Well-Being) as appropriate. This will require appropriate ARSTAF assistance.
- There will generally be four types of policies covered:
 - New policies unique to UFS systems and/or personnel aspects of UR
 - Policy revisions that materially change the scope of the existing policy
 - Policies that remain unchanged, however the execution will be held in abeyance until specified or scheduled windows
 - Policies that will not be changed, or otherwise modified, as a result of FS or UFS that may come into question

The source regulation for each policy will be updated during normal revision cycles to reflect changes in policy. Because this will require a significant period of time, AR 600-XX will be the primary source for UFS support policies. Additionally, business rules embedded in IT systems must be considered and modified as required. Work timeline is shown below.

Timeline.

Event	Staff Outline	ARSTAF Round Table	Formal Staffing w/ARSTAF	Publish	Distribute to Field
Date	Jan 04	Feb 04	Mar 04	Aug 04	Oct 04

2.5 Performance Metrics

The FS manning systems require an effective group of performance metrics with which to monitor progress and correct shortfalls. The Walter Reed Army Institute for Research (WRAIR) performed a great service for the COHORT and New Manning System programs in providing research studies on training, manning, and development shortfalls. These reports from the COHORT program should not be overlooked in the development of performance metrics for FS.

Currently, there are four emerging efforts:

1. Rand-Arroyo Center has developed a study, "Assessing the Effects of Unit Stabilization on Soldier and Unit Outcomes," Jan 9 2004, in which they will evaluate five separate areas of the FS program:
 - Develop better stability measures and assess historical trends in unit turbulence
 - Assess relationship of unit stability to training proficiency
 - Assess relationship of unit stability to Soldier level outcomes

- Investigate historical effect that personnel management by other militaries has had on combat outcomes
- Determine stabilization relationship with cohesion and CTC performance.

2. TFS, working with the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences (ARI), has established an evaluation team for the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Alaska. This effort will be reinforced to ensure that a system of measurements enables an evaluation team to accurately track progress as the units move through their development, equipping, training, certification, and deployment phases of Stabilization and UFS. In addition, metrics should be developed to evaluate accession, distribution, and assignment systems, training, deployment, and resetting the units. This should also include a longitudinal Soldier evaluation. Additional training metrics will be developed and included for the finalized structure determinations for new modular UAs.

3. In a third effort, TFS has developed a series of Performance Metrics for potential inclusion in the Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS).

4. Finally, TFS is assisting G-1 and G-3 in adjustment of the readiness metrics for personnel and training within the G-3 process. These will form the basis of continued work to review and analyze the progress of TFS efforts in bi-monthly reviews.

These efforts are adequate and simply need to be pulled together and managed by TFS (HRC). DAPE-MP will establish a work team with TFS, DAPE-PT, G-8, and DAMO-TR to create a feedback/reporting system and coalesce the measurement efforts. The team will follow the timeline below. Analysis of metrics should be provided to the G-1/G-3 at least semi-annually. In addition, field teams from ARI will be used to collect and analyze appropriate measurements.

Timeline:

Event	Organize FS Metrics Team	Coordinate FS Metrics Round Table	Conduct Staffing w/ARSTAFF	Publish FS Metrics	Commence Data Collection
Date	Feb 04	Mar 04	Apr 04 (SRS), Jun 04 (220-1)	Sep 04	FY 05

2.6 Information Systems to Support FS

The implementation of FS manning systems will require modification or possibly replacement of several current IT support systems and processes and design/modifications of DIMHRS as well as eHRS and others for the future both at HQDA and in the field. Areas of consideration include:

- Requisitioning and tracking systems
- Strength projection and management reports
- Manpower management models
- Retention options (e.g., reenlistment for a new assignment)
- Strength management systems in the field
- UIC registration (e.g., location codes for rotating units in SORTS)
- On-line assignment visibility and “bidding”

A task force has been convened by APTD, including members from HRC, USAR, ARNG, DAPE-MP, and TRADOC, and is focusing on the following specific areas:

- Policy and procedure: Advise key stakeholders of policy decisions once made so they can implement, revising procedures as required for requisitioning and tracking systems, strength projection, and manpower management models and reports.
- DIMHRS: Determine specifically what capabilities will be provided for managing the force and the delta in what capabilities are actually required.
- DIMHRS plus: Determine what capabilities must be satisfied beyond the “DIMHRS tool set,” whether through eHRS or other means (e.g., interface)

Timeline: The milestones and timeline to accomplish three steps above, with emphasis on DIMHRS capabilities and satisfying additional/remaining functional requirements are shown below. Follow-on meetings will be scheduled with smaller groups of stakeholders to focus on specific capabilities and functional requirements.

Event	Stakeholders Requirements Meetings	Final New System Approval	New System Design, Development, Testing	New System Deployment
Date	Dec 03-Mar 04	Aug 04	Oct 04	Oct 05

2.7 Operational and Institutional Training and Leader Development

There are several personnel and operational policies that will be modified in order to embrace Force Stabilization. The leader development culture of the Army will change from individual-centric to unit-centric. The changes in manning are driven by changes in the leader development and training of officers and NCOs.

Realizing the importance of modifications to the training and leader environment due to the advantages of Force Stabilization, a DAMO-TR working group met recently with TFS. From this meeting, the Director of the Training Directorate, DAMO-TRZ, indicated that he would use DAMO-TRL, DAMO-TRI, and DAMO-TRC to integrate these modifications. DAMO-TR, assisted by DAPE-MP (TFS), will establish a work group to ensure that Army Training and Leader Development Strategy (ATLDS) and resulting programs and plans are modified to incorporate the changes that will accrue from FS. The group will focus on Operational and Institutional training. DAMO-TR integration

should be accomplished by September 1, 2004, which is prior to the formation of the initial new UA under LM.

The Army Training and Leader Development Model centers on developing trained and ready units led by competent and confident leaders. Leader development is a lifelong learning process. The three core domains that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a Soldier's and leader's career are the *institutional*, *operational*, and *self-development* domains. Each domain has specific, measurable actions that must occur to develop our leaders.

Operational Domain: The operational domain includes home station training, combat training center rotations, joint training exercises, and operational deployments that satisfy national objectives. During this time, the commander is responsible for the wartime readiness of all elements of the formation. The commander is the primary trainer of the organization, responsible for ensuring that all training is conducted in accordance with the unit's mission essential task list (METL) to the Army standard. In the case of the Lifecycle unit, METL training is conducted during the Train time. The time length will vary based on the location of certification training, either at home station or at a CTC, and equipment refurbishment, and the number of METL tasks.

Since nearly 2/3 of the Soldiers and leaders will join a newly formed Lifecycle unit nearly simultaneously, the learning curve for the group will be almost concurrent. The initial unit Train will require refinement to establish precise and achievable METL requirements within the optimum time frame. The unit will be evaluated at the end of their Train phase that is not only a validation of the collective training, but also certifies the capabilities the unit brings to the joint fight, and the unit's readiness to deploy to theater. The certification event should take place during a CTC rotation. Ideally, the best case is a JNTC-focused CTC rotation to achieve the maximum joint context.

In the modularized BCTs, and UAs in the years ahead, sustainment training conducted after the initial unit train and certification, should not be in the crawl/walk/run model used for collective training before certification. In the Ready phase, given the "ready now" construct and the lack of personnel turnover, units should sustain a higher level of readiness and a narrower band of excellence than has been previously possible. Once a unit reaches the "run" stage, it should be possible to sustain it there and focus on more complex collective tasks. As an example, tank gunnery may change; if you have achieved crew stability why shoot all the lower gunnery tables during the sustain phase, execute the higher tables and emphasize collective training. This is what "accretive" training means. Using virtual, constructive, and live training the unit can move into more comprehensive aspects of a new training program that certainly can include more variety, such as aspects of Stabilization training, and Joint training. The certified UFS unit will be together for 2+ years for intense and varied training to include deployments. DAMO-TRC and TRADOC will develop training guidance for the BCTs.

Timeline. The following timeline will require G-3 and G-1 (TFS) to work closely to modify the Army Training and Leader Development Strategy (ATLDS) and program changes needed.

Event	DAMO-TRC establishes Training work team with DAPE-MP (TFS), TRADOC	DAMO-TRC conducts training round tables for Institutional, Collective, and Leader training (other)	DAMO-TRC (TFS) prepare and staff proposed modifications	Training Modifications approved by G-3, G-1, and TRADOC for implementation
Date	Feb 04	Feb-Apr 04	May-Jun 04	Sep-04

Institutional Domain. Since all of the Army’s 33 modularized BCTs (and hopefully an additional 15 BCTs) will eventually be manned under the UFS systems, TRADOC should develop training modules in enlisted basic and advanced training, at all officer and NCO basic and advanced courses, and at courses at C&GSC that review what is being developed in a UFS unit, how to build and expand cohesion through developing mutual trust and intensive accretive training, and the difference a leader faces in leading troops that will be (or have been) training and working together for some time. A young officer or NCO breaking into that cohesive group has a steep “learning curve.” It is also important that the institution support the stability and cohesion of the unit by conducting leader development courses as TDY vice PCS events and, as feasible, have multiple starts of these events per year to provide graduates when required.

“Unit Manning provides expanded opportunities for units to develop high levels of combat effectiveness through accretive training over a 3-year period. The unit manning system has consistently produced high levels of horizontal cohesion, but few leaders know how to foster the development of vertical cohesion and its resulting dramatic improvement in mission related performance...Successful leaders of Unit Manned units said that three facets of professional expertise are important: knowing, using, and imparting. Some leaders who start the Unit Manning experience well ahead of subordinates find themselves overtaken by their troops. They failed to grow professionally and lost the authority they derived from competence...Leaders at all levels depend for success on subordinates’ intelligence, competence, and devotion, rather than mindless compliance. The basis for this kind of discipline is mutual trust across all echelons. The fastest way to develop this trust is through empowerment – entrusting subordinates with a little more discretion and authority than they may be ready to handle.”

This quote, from a 1986 assessment of the COHORT system by the late Dr. Faris Kirkland, WRAIR, certainly reminds us that simply changing policies will not make FS, and particularly, UFS, successful. Success will come with solid, knowledgeable leadership and intense, accretive training. FS is more comprehensive than COHORT and the G-3 is working closely with G-1 to ensure that shortfalls of the past are eliminated and that UFS includes a unit-centric approach.

Leader.

“Today’s individual soldier and leader development programs, for example, were not designed to accommodate force stabilization. They must change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They must change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with Force Stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a few portions of the Army and invariably failed as a result.” An Army at War – A campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, February 17, 2004.

Leader training must be adjusted to recognize the benefits of cohesive units. Cohesion comes quickly when there is intense training or deployments for which the unit prepares and remains together. During the Train and Ready phases, the leader can now move his troops into more diverse and difficult operational requirements. This is an ideal opportunity during the Ready phase for added training with the supporting units of the BCT as well as Joint training events. The leader must also learn the different challenges of a Lifecycle unit. As an example, the young leader will quickly depend on and empower those who show exceptional talent in operations and willingness to accept more responsibility. How he works with them to develop the entire unit is key.

DAMO-TRL, DAMO-TRI, and TRADOC will develop leadership training modules for NCOs and officers to be provided at institutional and homebases and training guidance for the BCTs. The Work Group will need to analyze the impact of UFS and Stabilization principles on each NCO, WO, and Officer grade by Combat Arms, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support branches. In addition, the work group needs to work with the TRADOC branch proponents to ensure that the new career paths are viable and supportable.

Event	DAMO-TRL, establishes Training work team with DAMO-TRI, DAPE-MP (TFS), TRADOC	DAMO-TRL conducts training round tables for Institutional, Collective, and Leader training (other)	DAMO-TRL w/(TFS) prepare and staff proposed modifications	Training Modifications approved by G-3, G-1, and TRADOC for implementation
Date	Feb 04	Feb-Apr 04	May-Jun 04	Sep-04

Looking at professional development (Leader) modifications from a Personnel perspective and integrating the changes seamlessly with the G-3 training community is the task of DAPE-MP. FS implies stability and predictability - less movement in the initial years. This means a different developmental path. This also means that command opportunities will be changing, and that young officers and NCOs will have to prove their metal rapidly. As an example, no longer will a young officer or NCO be evaluated for “breadth” of experience in these initial years, but for solid growth and “depth.” Command of a platoon, Company XO or junior staff positions, TDY and Return to the Commander’s Course, and Company Command – all in the same unit may well become a new pattern.

As an example, one new Force Stabilization leader development criteria is that young officers and NCOs develop a “depth” of experience in their branch vice a “breadth” of experience in diverse activities. The Stabilization and UFS manning systems support a young Officer or NCO remaining in their initially assigned unit to gain such experience. The subsequent leader development guidance for young Officers and NCOs should change from obtaining varied experience in both “heavy” (mechanized, armor) and “light” (air assault, airborne, light Infantry) organizations during the company grade years to remaining in their current unit to gain depth of experience.

ARSTAF task forces are already reviewing changes for leader development of officers and NCOs. However, FS considerations have not yet been included. The G-1 is considering the execution of Functional Area Reviews and reviews of OPMS III and CMFs to include FS considerations. DAPE-MP will convene a supporting work group from TFS, DAPE-PR, DAPE-PT, DAMO-TRL, and HRC in a series of round table discussions to determine the appropriate changes in leader development criteria for officers, Warrant Officers, and NCOs based on FS, and in particular, UFS. The current ARSTAF professional development task forces should be included. The MP work group will further provide recommendations for changes in the DA Pamphlet 600-3 (Professional Development of Officers) and DA Pamphlet 600-25 (U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Development Guide).

Finally, the work group should review OPMS III and EPMS for conflicts.

Timeline. The work team will follow milestones and timeline below.

Event	DAPE-MP Establish PD group w/DAMO-TRL, DAPE-PT, HRC	DAPE-MP workgroup develops PD areas for consideration	Conduct PD Round Tables For Officers and NCOs	DAPE-MP Staffs Recommended Changes for G-1 Approval	Publish in DA Pamphlets
Date	Feb 04	Feb 04	Mar – May 04	May – Jul 04	Sep 04

3.0 PLANS UNDERWAY FOR FORCE STABILIZATION (STABILIZATION, LIFECYCLE, CYCLIC MANNING) AND UNIT ROTATION

3.1 Introduction

This section contains program decisions concerning how FS and UR systems will work operationally. The intent is to provide the larger operational picture to assist in crafting policies that best support program objectives. In-depth descriptions of the mechanics of Stabilization, LM, and CM are shown at Annexes C, D, and E, respectively.

3.2 Stabilization

1. Definition: All Soldiers assigned to CONUS installations will remain as long as possible. Their reassignment is driven not by time, but by needs of the Army, leader development considerations, and finally, by their individual preference. It is the desire that a Soldier or officer be able to complete branch and MOS specific requirements that make them eligible for institutional assignments (recruiter, drill sergeant, ROTC instructor, AC/RC, etc.). It would be optimum if two or more of the criteria are met simultaneously, however, the needs of the Army will dictate. Soldiers and officers will attend professional development courses such as BNCOC and the Captain's career course in a TDY and return status. Enlisted Soldiers can reenlist Present Duty of Needs of the Army. Following this initial "extended" tour, leaders are encouraged to serve repetitive assignments at their Stabilization installation or "region" unless they are required to depart for professional development, or to fill Institutional Army and specialized unit requirements (no moves to same duty position at different posts). Detailed description is at Annex C. This will slow down and stabilize the force setting the conditions for transition to UFS (below) that will align a Soldier's assignment to the unit's operational cycles.

2. Intent: The intent of this model is to increase stability, predictability, and readiness for Soldiers, Units, and families. In the BCTs and other units on the installation, this will be accomplished by creating stable teams that train and stay together while minimizing unneeded turnover each year. The building block is the BCT/UA on the installation. Once a Soldier or young officer arrives at the BCT/UA, every effort will be made to stabilize them within the BCT/UA for an extended period. If the BCT/UA is transitioned to the Lifecycle model, Soldiers and officers will remain for the unit lifecycle, generally 36 months. If they must be moved for force structure reasons as they are promoted, stabilizing at the installation level is the next desired option, with region being the final option. In every circumstance, maintaining the BCT/UA with stabilized Soldiers is the default mechanism. Soldiers will advance to higher grades to fill a smaller number of positions available within the hierarchical pyramid taking attrition through ETS into account.

3. Timeline. TFS will establish a work team with elements of G-3, G-1, HRC, TRADOC, and FORSCOM to develop the detailed procedures for Stabilization implementation.

Event	TFS establishes Stabilization work team	TFS conducts Round Tables for new Stabilization procedures	TFS/G-1 publishes Stabilization manning procedures	TFS executes Stabilization during 4 th Quarter FY 04
Date	Feb 04	Feb – Mar 04	May 04	Aug 04

4. Stabilization Implementation within CONUS: Effective in August 2004, the Army will initiate the Stabilization Manning system for all Soldiers and officers on all CONUS installations. This change means that individuals will be assigned or reassigned for the following priorities: 1) to meet the needs of the Army, 2) to meet individual leader development needs, and 3) to meet individual personal preferences.

3.3 Unit Focused Stabilization - Lifecycle Management (LM)

1. Definition. There are three phases in a lifecycle: Reset, Train, and Ready. During the initial Reset Phase, approximately 2-months, the unit is brought to full strength and receives needed equipment. (Use of the term Reset in LM refers only to personnel reset and does not apply to the current G-4/CES program for returning OIF/OEF units.) During the Train Phase, approximately 4-months, lifecycle units conduct focused training from individual through collective, culminating with a certification exercise (CERTEX) during the Ready Phase at a Combat Training Center (CTC) or a Major Readiness Exercise (MRE) in a local training area. These phases may be curtailed or extended depending on the requirements of GWOT and training constraints. During the Reset and Train Phases, the unit will not be required to conduct installation support activities, Special Duty, or Borrowed Military Manpower. **Note: The Reset and Train Phases may be curtailed or extended from the total of six calendar months depending upon requirements of GWOT and training constraints.**

The Ready Phase marks a 30-month period in which a unit is available for employment. During this phase, a unit can conduct accretive training, either live, virtual or constructive, or participate in Joint operations. They can be scheduled for Deployment Ready Brigade (DRB) type missions and incorporated into the FORSCOM Personnel, Tasking, and Training Management System (PTTMS) for Divisional units, which outlines red, amber, and green cycles. At the completion of a 36-month lifecycle, the unit will undergo the same Reset activities. Based upon Soldier promotions and professional development needs, from 30% to 40% of a lifecycled unit could “roll-over” for an additional 3-year tour and form the core of the subsequent unit. During the end-of-cycle Reset phase, incoming and outgoing personnel simultaneously conduct transition activities (HHG, CIF, in/out process, property and equipment transfer, etc). Detailed description is at Annex D.

2. Lifecycle Model

Reset Phase + Train Phase:
6 months

Ready Phase:
30 Months



P-rating = ← P1 →
T-rating = ← T4 → T1 →

3. Intent. The intent of the LM is to synchronize a Soldier's tour of duty with a unit's operational cycle. Goals of this model are to improve combat effectiveness by building better-trained and cohesive units and by maximizing a unit's deployable strength during its Ready Phase. The types of organizations earmarked for LM are modularized Brigade Combat Teams or Units of Action (BCT/UAs) and other Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) units where combat readiness and cohesion are paramount.

4. Timeline. TFS will establish a work team with elements of G-3, G-1, HRC, TRADOC, and FORSCOM to determine the procedures for implementing both LM and CM. See paragraph 3.4 for CM.

Event	TFS establishes LM and CM work team	TFS conducts Round Tables for new LM and CM procedures	TFS/G-1 publishes LM and CM manning procedures	G-1/HRC executes LM during 4 th Quarter FY 04
Date	Feb 04	Feb – Mar 04	May 04	Aug 04

5. Units for Lifecycle Manning. The following units have been nominated for implementation of UFS (LM): **Note: The 3ID will start becoming modularized in the late Summer, 2004. The BCTs of 3ID will not be manned initially under the Lifecycle model. The 2d CR (Stryker) will be reorganized under the Lifecycle model in the 1st Qtr, FY 05. The 4-101 AA and 3-10 MTN BCTs will be built and manned under the Lifecycle model. Some personnel will be positioned in late 4th quarter, FY 04. 4-4ID, also scheduled for lifecycle manning in FY 05, is temporarily on hold. Units beyond FY 05 are tentative and may be realigned due to requirements of GWOT.**

Units for Lifecycle Manning

		Implementation								"Steady State"							
	FY04	Type	FY 05	Type	FY 06	Type	FY 07	Type	FY08 (see 05)	Type	FY09 (see 06)	Type	FY10 (see 07)	Type			
1st Quarter	SBCT3 (172d)	S	4-4 ID	H	4-1 CD	H	SBCT3	S	4-4 ID	H	4-1 CD	H	SBCT3	S			
					SBCT 2	S	2-82 ABN	I	4-3 ID	H	SBCT 2	S	2-82 ABN	I			
					SBCT 5	S	2-10 MTN	I			SBCT 5	S	2-10 MTN	I			
					3-25 ID	I	2-3 ID	H			3-25 ID	I	2-3 ID	H			
2nd Quarter			1-4 ID	H	4-25 ID	I	3-4 ID	H	2-1 CD	H	4-25 ID	I	3-4 ID	H			
			SBCT 1	S			3-3 ID (Ben)	H	SBCT4 (2CR)	S	2-101 AA	I	3-3 ID (Ben)	H			
			SBCT4 (2CR)	S			3-2 ID	I	SBCT 1	S			3-2 ID	I			
3rd Quarter			1-1 ID (Riley)	H	4-82 ABN	I	2-4 ID	H	1-1 ID (Riley)	H	4-82 ABN	I	2-4 ID	H			
					3-1 AD (Riley)	H	4-2 ID	I	1-1 CD	H	3-1 AD (Riley)	H	4-2 ID	I			
					3 ACR	H	1-101 AA	I	1-10 MTN	I	3 ACR	H	1-101 AA	I			
					1-25 ID	I	4-1 AD	I	1-82 ABN	I	1-25 ID	I	4-1 AD	I			
4th Quarter	3-10 MTN	I	4-10 MTN	I	1-3 ID	H	3-82 ABN	I	4-10 MTN	I	3-101 AA	I	3-82 ABN	I			
	4-101 AA	I	2-25 ID	I	501 ABN AK*	I	4-1 ID	I	2-25 ID	I	1-3 ID	H	4-1 ID	I			
			3-1 CD	H			3-10 MTN	I	3-1 CD	H	501 ABN AK	I	3-10 MTN	I			
						4-101 AA	I					4-101 AA	I				
Key	Heavy UAs	0	Heavy UAs	4	Heavy UAs	4	Heavy UAs	4	Heavy UAs	7	Heavy UAs	4	Heavy UAs	4			
H: Heavy	Infantry UAs	2	Infantry UAs	2	Infantry UAs	5	Infantry UAs	10	Infantry UAs	4	Infantry UAs	7	Infantry UAs	10			
I: Infantry	Stryker UAs	1	Stryker UAs	2	Stryker UAs	2	Stryker UAs	1	Stryker UAs	2	Stryker UAs	2	Stryker UAs	1			
S: Stryker	Stab UAs	3	Stab UAs	8	Stab UAs	11	Stab UAs	15	Stab UAs	13	Stab UAs	13	Stab UAs	15			
Shading indicates activations																	
			Edate is generally when personnel should be there (P3) and training can begin. *Requires a one-time 24-month life cycle to allow transition to "steady-state." Not included 173d, 1 and 2 Bdes 1AD, 2 and 3 Bdes 1ID or 1 and 2 Bde, 2 ID. Note 4/1AD and 4/ID if activated will be under Infantry Design.														
														as of 201100 Apr 04			

3.4 Unit Focused Stabilization - Cyclic Management (CM)

1. Definition. CM is focused on command and control elements of non-lifecycle units and low density/high impact units where continuity of operations is paramount such as headquarters staffs and support battalions above brigade level. CM consists of two phases, Sustain and Ready. During the Sustain Phase, leader and Soldier assignments are organized into personnel packages and synchronized with a pre-determined 1 – 2 month period when 15 – 30 percent of personnel losses will occur. The Ready Phase begins at the end of one Sustain Phase and continues to the beginning of the subsequent Sustain Phase. The new personnel are rapidly integrated into the team as this integration only occurs once per cycle. The total cycle, which consists of a Sustain and Ready phase, could last 9 – 24 months. However, the optimum length is 12 months. (See Annex E).

Cyclic Manning Model.



2. Intent. The overall concept of this model is to produce a stable, cohesive, and more deployable unit. Cyclic results in losses ranging between 10-30%, but is more suited for units where continuity of operations is paramount. Cyclic combines features of Lifecycle and the IRS.

3. Timeline. Timeline will be developed when G-3 provides modularity timelines.

3.5 Unit Deployment and Rotation as Part of Army Posture of Engagement

The Army is moving toward CONUS-basing the majority of its BCT/UAs. This strategy includes both combat theater deployments as well as training deployments of brigade size organizations periodically to strategic worldwide locations. Units will be deploying for short periods and will have to be ready to “hit the ground running.” The rotation ratio and the number and size of units involved are still under review and, in the short term, will be OPTEMPO driven. Preparing units for deployment requires coordinated strength management and force shaping actions. Stabilization and subsequent UFS will provide organization and synchronization in managing personnel turnover and unit readiness. Synchronizing the Soldier’s time in the unit with the operational requirements will ensure all assigned Soldiers can deploy, remain with, and redeploy with their unit. Under today’s turbulence filled manning system, fully one third of the unit will depart in any given year. Thus, when a unit is alerted for deployment, a large portion of the force cannot go without invoking stop-move and/or stop-loss actions. As replacements are found for the non-deployable Soldiers, turbulence is increased in non-deploying units, compounding the problem across the Installation and Army. An integrated FS manning program overlaid on an expeditionary force that projects power through unit rotations would significantly improve readiness while providing added stability and predictability to Soldiers and families.

The charts below outline projections for unit deployments/rotations:

Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan – Unit Rotations		
<u>OEF-A 3</u>	<u>OEF-A 4 (AUG 03)</u>	<u>OEF-A 5(FEB 04)</u>
82d Airborne Division (-)	10th Mountain Division (-)	25th Infantry Division (-)
Bosnia (SFOR)		
<u>SFOR 13</u>		<u>SFOR 14(SEP 03)</u>
35th Infantry Division (-) (KS ARNG)		34th Infantry Division (-) (MN ARNG)
Kosovo (KFOR)		
<u>KFOR 5A</u>		<u>KFOR 5B (FEB 04)</u>
28th Infantry Division (-) (PA ARNG)		34th Infantry Division (-) (MN ARNG)

Sinai (MFO)		
1-133d Infantry, 34th ID (IA ARNG)		1-125th Infantry, 38th ID (MI ARNG) (JAN 04)

Note: Rotations are 6-Months in Duration

Operation Iraqi Freedom – Unit Rotations

OIF 1	OIF 2	Projected
3rd Infantry Division (-)	82d Airborne Division (-)*	Sep 03
1st Marine Expeditionary Force	Polish Multi-National Div	Sep/Oct 03
4th Infantry Division	1st INF Div (-) w/ INF Bde (ARNG)*	Mar/Apr 04
1st Armored Division	1st CAV Div w/ INF Bde (ARNG)*	Feb/Apr 04
2nd Light CAV Regiment	Bde / 1st CAV Div	Mar/Apr 04
3rd Armored CAV Regiment	Stryker Brigade 1 (Oct 03)	Mar/Apr 04
101st AASLT Division	Multi-National Division	Feb/Mar 04
2nd Brigade, 82d Airborne Div	Redeploys	Jan 04
173rd Airborne Brigade	Redeploys	Apr 04

* 6 Month Rotation

OIF 1 & 2 are 12 Month Rotations except as noted

4.0 IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW

Turbulence-reducing manning initiatives will be implemented in stages beginning with Stabilization at all CONUS installations beginning fourth quarter FY04. For the immediate future, operations in OIF and OEF will continue to keep the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO at a high rate. However, once these have been reduced it is the primary objective of FS to reduce externally generated moves and provide stability and predictability to Soldiers and families. Starting in the 4th quarter of FY 04, UFS (Lifecycle Manning) will be phased in for selected modularizing BCTs.

Assignment lead-time

During the transition to Stabilization and UFS manning models, Soldiers will experience assignment lead times similar to the current individual replacement model lead times – on average 6-9 months. Currently, GWOT lead times are 3-5 months, but improving. Soldiers entering the Army beginning in FY05 will expect to remain at their initially assigned FORSCOM installation for the duration of their initial extended tour. Soldiers on their first tour during the transition years FY05 through FY07 can expect a phased reduction in turbulence as UR and Stabilization phase in. As unit deployments/rotations are phased in, and designated forces return permanently from OCONUS, permanent change of station (PCS) moves to OCONUS locations will be reduced further enhancing stability at CONUS installations.

Web-based assignments (long-range goals)

It is the intent of the Enterprise Human Resources System (eHRS) when completely fielded to allow Soldiers to view available assignments on-line. During the recruiting stage, Soldier qualifications will still dictate MOS and location availability. Soldiers will be able to view all available installations (based upon their qualifications) with fidelity down to individual brigade combat teams. Between UFS and/or Stabilization tours, Soldiers will have the same capability to view available (by qualifications) assignments by location, unit, and MOS/grade before submitting preferences. Assignments will still be vetted and approved at HRC.

Variable Enlistment Contracts

Beginning in FY04, enlistment contracts will specify a length of service after initial entry training is complete. The concept behind these enlistment contracts is to eliminate the ambiguity of the time the Soldier will spend in operational units. Additionally, variable enlistment length (VEL) contracts allow for the synchronization of Soldier and unit timelines. VEL contracts will begin with Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) that comprise the majority of the brigade combat teams. Expansion of this program across MOSs will continue in subsequent years.

Deployment Rider (mid-range goals)

Beginning in FY04, if changes are deemed legal and accepted, all enlistment contracts, officer service obligations, and re-enlistment contracts will include a deployment clause which allows the Army G-1 to extend the length of initial enlistment or service obligation

by 12-months or to the conclusion of an on-going operational deployment plus 90 days, whichever is less. In other words, if a Soldier or officer would normally reach the end of their enlistment or Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) while their unit is deployed to an operational requirement, the Army G-1, based upon operational requirements projected by the Army G-3, can invoke the deployment clause by specific unit for the shorter of 12 months or the length of the deployment plus 90 days. The 90 days beyond the deployment is added to allow for redeployment and required post-deployment actions including the Soldier's out-processing.

4.1 Staff Responsibilities

G-1

- Supervise implementation of all manning initiatives
- Review all personnel and operational manning policies that will be impacted by the implementation of the initiatives. Modify or request permission to modify associated policies, regulations, and laws
- DMPP will provide policy and HQDA oversight of FS to monitor progress throughout the implementation process
- Adjust accession mission to facilitate UFS
- Ensure that both DA Pamphlets 600-3 and 600-25 are reviewed and appropriate professional development guidance is developed to grow an officer and NCO corps into the unit-centered aspects of FS.
- Coordinate with G-3 to incorporate readiness enhancements of UFS units in the reporting requirements of AR 220-1.
- Coordinate with G-3 to ensure that Army operational, institutional, and leader training strategies and programs are modified to accommodate UFS units and prepare leaders to achieve enhanced levels of readiness.
- Redesign or eliminate branch detail program.

G-3

- Provide E-dates for selected force structure changes 24 months in advance in TAADS
- Synchronize unit availability and potential deployment schedules with unit lifecycles (ready period). Incorporate modularity into this schedule.
- Provide units designated for unit deployment/rotation in support of the posture of engagement a minimum of 9 months in advance of deployment.
- Provide units designated for UFS (LM) at least 9 months in advance of Reset date, to include SBCTs, BCTs, and UAs.
- Develop Army Training and Leader Development Strategy and program changes to accommodate operational, institutional and Leader domain requirements of FS leaders and units.

- Provide assistance to G-1 in resolving all policy issues that inhibit FS, such as: individual augmentees from Active Army units; professional development schooling TDY and return for company grade officers and NCOs; FS enhancements/modifications to AR 220-1, etc.

G-8

- Incorporate UFS into all future Unit Set fielding plans and implementation.

ACSIM

- Work closely with G-1 and G-3 to ensure that installations as our flagships can accommodate units and families involved with the UFS manning programs and the unit deployments in support of the Army's posture of engagement.

Human Resources Command (HRC)

- Assign Soldiers to units following the manning rules outlined in the specific annexes
- Synchronize assignments of VEL and TOS contracts to meet UFS unit skill level 1 (SL1) requirements
- Develop methodology to extend Soldiers in deployed units when operational requirements delay programmed redeployment
- Synchronize school seats with unit needs and operational requirements
- Manage HRAP to facilitate synchronization of IET graduates to unit assignments
- Develop interactive web-based accession and assignment processing system
- Execute Force Stabilization manning initiatives

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

DCSOPS&T

Assist DA G-3 Training in the development of Army Training and Leader Development Strategy and program changes to accommodate requirements of FS units in the institutional, operational, and leader training domains (See Chapter 2).

- **Personnel Proponents and Branch Schools**
 - Train the programmed load within budget constraints (per ATRRS)
 - Recommend options to eliminate the Branch Detail Program
 - Develop training for officers and NCOs regarding leader requirements for building cohesive units and developing challenging, accretive training for UFS units.
 - Review and update career progression maps defining a successful career

Accessions Command

- Implement Variable Enlistment Length contracts beginning in FY04
- Meet accession targets with quality recruits
- Implement web-based enlistment/assignment system (officer and enlisted)
- Write contracts for specific installations and MACOMs
- Implement Deployment Rider contracts when approved
- Synchronize accessions to scheduled school seats

5.0 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

5.1 Introduction

The Strategic Communications Plan for FS will be an integrated part of the Army's Strategic Communication Plan within the Army Campaign Plan that covers the Army Focus Areas. The message on "why" the Army is initiating FS that includes Stabilization, LM, and CM systems, is important to all members of the Army. The message on "how" FS implementation will work must be communicated. Neither the Stabilization nor the UFS LM or CM programs are the same as previously tried unit manning programs. They do have as their ultimate goal to be able to keep Soldiers and Officers together longer in their units, but they are not COHORT, Brigade 75, Gyroscope, or any number of other previous programs. What FS is, and how it will work, must be understood by Soldiers and external audiences.

5.2 Key Messages and Themes

The concept and approach for FS can get lost in the details and the "baggage" from previous attempts. Therefore, the FS "core messages" must be clearly stated. It must describe the current situation and "burning platform" for change. The "burning platform" is **reducing turbulence to enable commanders to develop high performing units ready for Joint, expeditionary missions**. Selecting key themes and messages can be helpful. Some examples are listed below to start the process of refining the message. FS will provide Soldiers and families with increased stability and improved predictability

- FS will accelerate the development of the "expeditionary mindset" in the minds of Soldiers
- FS minimizes Army Readiness "volatility"
- FS slows down the turbulence of the force
- Stabilization complements UFS and for some units is a stepping stone to LM or CM
- Stabilization will increase the time on station across the CONUS force
- FS enables commanders to build and train a cohesive, highly effective fighting force
- FS enables commanders and units to participate in Joint operations at all levels
- A smaller, dedicated, highly motivated force that has trained together and molded into a cohesive team will defeat a larger, less dedicated, and motivated force.
- The complexity of the future battlefield, and how we plan to fight the Future Force units, requires much more training and teamwork, therefore keeping Soldiers together is critical. UFS will do that.
- We have leveraged technology and we must likewise leverage cohesion as a significant combat multiplier.

- UFS will enable Soldiers and officers to obtain "depth" of experience that is more important than his or her "breadth" of experience.
- FS will reduce turbulence and organize turnover that exists today into manageable periodic windows.
- FS is best supported by TDY & Return leader development schooling of short duration.
- Unit lifecycle = 36 months.

5.3 Media Campaign

It is important that this media Campaign be an integral part of the Army Strategic Communication Media Campaign. However, TFS is responsible for its development. The purpose of the FS media campaign is to maximize information flow about FS throughout the Army using numerous methodologies and assets. Installation commanders, brigade and battalion commanders and CSM, public affairs officers, and personnel officers are key communicators of unit manning information. Key decisions about manning and personnel are significant news at the installation level.

Personnel policy decisions made by the Department of the Army will affect how and when units are manned. Decisions made by the DCS, G-1 on FS will be made and disseminated through Military Personnel messages (MILPER) will have depth of rationale to assist in understanding and dissemination.

The Director, DAPE-MP, with assistance from TFS and DAPE-PT, will provide key information that must be communicated and understood by commanders, Soldiers, and other audiences. It is recommended that wherever possible, HRC/TFS provide a **knowledgeable** team, such as PMAT, to each installation as they transition to Stabilization or UFS. In addition to being knowledgeable, they must be believers in what they are conveying. There will be several questions about the changes in policy and basically the new "rules." The team must be able to provide the rule and the rationale. Each Soldier or officer will starting his or her personal change cycle and will need a full understanding to enable him or her to quickly move to acceptance. It is recommended that further, that each team where possible include a representative from G-3 training to discuss the Train and Ready phases. FS is a CSA - ARSTAF program. The team needs G-3 support. If the visits generate several G-4 requirements, then it is recommended that a G-4 (or G-8) representative also accompany the team.

The following assets should be leveraged to relay this information:

FS Website – provides a solid baseline for past and present day information about unit manning principles and procedures.

Army News Service – stories posted on ARNEWS serve as the Department of the Army's electronic news source for print publications.

Installation Newspapers - can be used for direct feed of FS news as FS decisions are made. Direct coordination with installation Public Affairs Officers will help ensure that the right information is available and printed in post newspapers. Examples are the Hawaii Army Weekly (25th Infantry Division), the Northwest Guardian (Ft. Lewis), the Paraglide (Ft. Bragg), and the Pentagongram (Washington D.C). An electronic link to post and installation newspapers is found on the Public Affairs home page.

Email – is an efficient and timely way to disseminate unit manning information such as briefing charts etc.

Soldiers Radio and Television – the Army’s official television station is located adjacent to U.S. Army Human Resources Command in Alexandria, VA. SRTV produces a newscast bi-monthly and records radio spots on a daily basis.

Soldiers Magazine – the magazine’s staff prints stories and information found on the Army News Service, but can also interview members of the TFS.

Other assets – Army Times, AUSA News, Parameters, Military Review, Infantry, Field Artillery magazines, etc. are some of the other means FS information can be disseminated to the force. All means available will be used to educate Soldiers, civilians, and other personnel about FS, Stabilization, and UFS.

Feedback Network – As mentioned in the Section on Performance Metrics, page 17, the TFS will establish a feedback network to ensure that progress of new initiatives is being understood, utilized, and where necessary creates appropriate modifications.

Force Stabilization Playbook – TFS will develop a playbook that discusses personnel aspects of the Stabilization, LM, and CM manning systems and how they should be implemented by the units and installations in the field. This will not take the place of this Implementation Plan, nor the new AR 600-XX (Force Stabilization) when it is published, but will serve as a helpful supplement

Timeline. As in other tasks, TFS will establish a work team to complete the Strategic Communication Plan. The initial item in the plan will be the CSA’s Command Release regarding the 16 Immediate Focus Areas, of which FS is one. DAPE-MP will then provide continuing details to the Army and other interested organizations.

Event	TFS establishes work team to complete Strategic Communication Plan	TFS initiates plan with OCLL, ECC and HRC PAO assistance	Initial Media Release	Plan approved by G-1	Items released via media plan to Commanders, Army at large, Congress, etc.
Date	Feb 04	Feb 04	9 Feb 04	Apr 04	Jun 04 – Sep 04

6.0 COORDINATION AND POINTS OF CONTACT

6.1 Introduction

The table below is provided as a reference guide to assist in the coordination of actions.

6.2 Points of Contact

Name	Organization	e-Mail	Phone
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G-3			
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A - ANNEX A – KEY MILESTONES

The Milestones below are compiled from the separate tasking paragraphs of the preceding plan. Each tasking paragraph is accompanied with a timeline.

Action	Lead (L), Assist (A), Coordination (C)	Start Date	Complete Date
Design and develop FS Manning systems (Stabilization, LM, CM)	L-TFS, A-APTD	15 Sep 03	5 Nov 03
Develop Army FS Implementation Plan for ARSTAFF and MACOM	L-APTD, A-TFS, C-as required	15 Oct 03	1 Feb 04
Track progress of all tasks within this Implementation Plan	L-DMPP, A-APTD, A-TFS	1 Jan 04	Ongoing
Develop Strategic Communications Plan	L-TFS, A-CPA, APTD	1 Nov 03	1 Jun 04
Review/Revise/Staff <i>Critical</i> and <i>Essential</i> Policies	L-DMPP, A-APTD, TFS	1 Oct 03	1 Mar 04
Review/Revise/Staff <i>Sustainable</i> and <i>Status Quo</i> Policies	L-DMPP, A-APTD, TFS	15 Dec 03	1 Jul 04
Develop and Publish AR 600-XX Force Stabilization	L-DMPP, A-TFS, APTD	1 Nov 03	1 Aug 04
Develop Action Plan for Conversion of current/future information systems to support FS	L-APTD, A-TFS, HRC	11 Dec 03	1 Oct 04
Develop Performance Metrics Feedback Plan for Evaluation of all aspects of FS	L-TFS, A-DMPP, APTD	5 Jan 04	1 Jun 04
Integrate appropriate Force Stabilization metrics into Army SRS	L-DMPP, A-TFS, APTD	5 Jan 04	1 Jun 04
Review DA Pam 600-3 and 600-25 and determine appropriate changes to Officer and NCO Professional Development based on FS.	L-DMPP, A-TFS, APTD	1 Feb 04	1 Jul 04
Review AR 220-1 to determine appropriate changes based on FS	L-G-3, A-TFS, DMPP, APTD	5 Jan 04	1 Oct 04
Revise Army Training & Leader Development Strategy and programs to include FS enhancements (Institutional [incl. Leader], Operational Domains)	L-DAMO-TR, A-TFS, APTD, DMPP	23 Dec 03	1 Aug 04
Develop plan for conversion of current/future IT systems and processes to support FS	L-APTD, A-TFS, DMPP, HRC	11 Dec 03	1 Oct 04
Develop plan of Stab and UFS procedures with HRC, others	L-TFS, A-TRADOC, DMPP, APTD	2 Feb 04	1 May 04/ 1 Aug 04
Develop a “Playbook” of Stabilization and UFS procedures for units to follow	L-TFS, A-APTD	5 Jan 04	1 May 04

B - ANNEX B – PERSONNEL INHIBITORS TO FORCE STABILIZATION

Introduction

In this section, the major personnel "friction points" for Stabilization, LM, and CM will be reviewed to provide a better understanding of the full scope of change required. Additionally, each "friction point" will be evaluated for possible impacts and, in some cases, an approach to developing solutions. These solutions will guide the revision and/or development of FS manning policies. Some examples of possible courses of action (COA) are provided to begin the thought process about ways to resolve the "friction point."

Friction Points – Considerations for Change – Stabilization and Unit Focused Stabilization

The primary approach for this analysis is to review past initiatives to gain insights and identify "points of friction." Past manning initiatives included Brigade 75, COHORT, Gyroscope, and Battalion Rotation. All of these programs had both positive and negative impacts on the personnel system and the Army at large that can be leveraged for future efforts.

The following table outlines the major friction points for Stabilization and UFS, some alternatives on how best to display the impacts, and some possible COAs.

Unit Focused Stabilization Friction Points

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
Personnel Readiness Reporting	Current metrics are all based on various snapshots of strength levels measured in monthly cycles, the metrics are derivatives of various combinations of "space to face" ratios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Model a single battalion over time to project and demonstrate how UFS impacts on current readiness measures: aggregate strength, available strength, senior grade, and MOS trained 2. Extrapolate results to all units included in FS 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revise current metrics—consider capability driven metrics 2. Develop new metrics that are performance oriented 3. Accept the current rating system as the cost of cohesion and stability

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
Distribution Guidance	<p>Current distribution guidance is based on fixed Manning levels usually calling for 100% continuous fill</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UFS units will not be maintained at a constant 100% 2. Non-UFS units may be affected, depending on priority of fill and timing of available accessions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. First, compute range of strength levels for non-UFS units under current guidance assuming fill priority 2. Second, compute UFS strength variations to for remaining units 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Revise distribution guidance for UFS units establishing floors and ceilings 2. Minimize the number of units requiring constant 100% fill 3. Reduce impact of nondeployable Soldier inventory
Force Structure	Changes in force structure are not synchronized with unit's operational cycle	Provide data that displays the number of authorization changes that take place over time (ICPs, MOS, Base TOEs)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Align unit's e-date with the operational cycle 2. Allow Cdr upgrade based on timing and cohesion
	MOS conversions (MOCS Actions)	Capture data that displays auth impact by UIC, grade, e-date (proposed)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Align unit's e-date with the operations cycle if major change 2. Allow to occur at any time. If no auth changes occur only a change of label
	Unit modernization not synchronized with unit's operational cycle	Gather data that demonstrates the number of changes over time that would impact on the stability of the unit	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Align unit's e-date with the operational cycle 2. If no personnel impact proceed at any time (i.e., grade). MOS remain same or less than 10% change by grade/MOS

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
Institutional Army requirements	The TDA Army requires Soldiers to be moved in support of sustaining and institutional requirements that interrupt periods of stabilization	Compare the TOE and TDA requirements for several MOS to illustrate proportion of stabilization breaks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reduce the number of TDA requirements through outsourcing 2. Recode positions where feasible to "duty MOS" 3. Link a grouping of TOE units, and the Soldiers, to TDA positions for return assignments 4. Change culture to reward stable assignment in TDA
Professional development	Soldiers and leaders progress through various assignments in order to broaden their experience base in preparation for higher level positions	Display the career maps for several high density MOS resident in FS units indicating positions that are not normally documented in line units that are part of PD pattern	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change mind set and career maps to reflect depth of experience 2. Recode as many positions as possible that are outside of unit to other MOS
Soldier and Leader Development	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NCOs not able to attend training during Reset period due to lack of training seats, various course lengths, and commander's discretion. 2. Professional development schools that comprise the OES and NCOES system are attended based on individual availability and Seat capacity without regard to unit lifecycle. The current "select, train, promote policy" requires attendance shortly after attaining list status 	A static model displaying the OES and NCOES systems with supporting data, such as; average YOS, pin-on times, length of courses	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change "select, train, promote" policy to "train, select, promote" 2. Remove time constraint but make NCOES/OES requirement for consideration 3. Do not attend school during major life-cycle events 4. Decrease the length of schools 5. Provide distance learning support 6. Move the classroom to the unit 7. Constructive credit

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
Culture	Redefining many aspects of the personnel life-cycle and the way it impacts on the active forces, along with the impacts on training, education, command tours, etc., will require a complete change in mind set that must be shaped	May not be able to directly model, however, changing the mind set will require casting most of the friction points in terms of how the UFS system will work	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Requires a methodically planned communications plan 2. Change Board guidance to reward traits desired
Quality of Life (Well-Being)	Current policies emphasize summer focused moves for families and assignment of dual military couples	Gather data that displays the number of family summer moves and assignment of dual military couples to the same installation and the number of changes over time	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue with summer focused moves for non-UFS families 2. In UFS units, enable military member to move first, or later to next assignment 3. Eliminate these policies 4. Move in summer to HQ/installation and accept increased TTHS and turbulence at HQ
In and Out Processing Capacities	Installations are resourced to process an even flow of Soldiers, not wide variances, especially true for small forward deployed garrisons	Establish the current baseline capacity as a ratio of support (workload factor), then estimate the capacity required	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contract out increased support requirements 2. Use mobile teams that travel in a given region
Stabilization	Current policies encourage stabilization of families based on high school-aged children and stabilization based on post-deployment or hardship	Gather data that demonstrates numbers of families in these categories.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Endeavor to move military member within 3-month window either before or after family 2. Post-deployment policy may have to be changed due to OPTEMPO 3. Eliminate these policies

Friction Points – Considerations for Change – Unit Rotation

The following table outlines some of the major friction points for UR, alternatives on how best to display the impacts, and some possible COAs to revise the policy.

Unit Rotation Friction Points

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
PERSTEMPO and Quality-of-Life	Thresholds are established to assist in managing a reasonable level of PERSTEMPO to support a quality of life for Soldiers and families—routine deployments will increase the rate, special pay is provided to Soldiers exceeding a legal limit	Beginning with current PERSTEMPO data as a baseline, factor in the increased PERSTEMPO generated by rotations of 1:5 and/or current operational requirements	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reduce the number of training events requiring time away from home (deployment) 2. Increase the use of RC and forces from other services or other nations to cover deployment requirements 3. Pay Soldiers and/or add additional benefits for Soldiers who are deployed (non-monetary and monetary)
Well-Being	<p>Two separate issues:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Installation infrastructure must support a greater number of Soldiers and families 2. If rotation to a remote site, support facilities at the deployment site must be sufficient quality 	Compare current support facilities to projected support (e.g., current DODDS attendance to projected increase)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Build new facilities or increase capacity 2. Provide enhanced well-being programs to compensate 3. Compensate Soldiers for degraded well-being 4. Establish new MWR programs to include RC

Functional Area	Friction Point	Approach to Assessing Impacts and/or Modeling	CoA That Create Degrees of Freedom (Examples)
Housing	Installation housing (or Quarters Allowance) in CONUS must be increased to support expanded number of families (subset of Well-Being)	Determine the increased capacity required by applying factors to deployed population (percent married and live on post)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Accelerate RCI projects 2. Provide additional subsidies to Soldiers to buy their own house 3. Renovate existing housing
Personnel Service Support for Deployed Units	Maintaining acceptable level of service for Soldiers and commanders that are deployed	Identify critical personnel services and frequency of support (e.g., mail, medical process)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide online services where IT enablers are in place 2. Send contact teams forward to provide essential services

Personnel Inhibitors (167) to Unit Focused Stabilization

Essential: (2)

- Variable Enlistment Length
- Command Tour

Critical: (29)

- Short Term Enlistment Options
- Accession Mission/Recruiting Mission
- In-Service Recruiting
- General Policy – Soldiers will be stabilized for a period of 12 months on arrival
- Unit Formation – Levels of Fill
- SL1
- SL1 (Low Density MOS)
- All SL 2-5
- SL1 substitution
- Officers
- Aggregate strength
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 1 – Division average for a specialty code/grade or MOS/skill level
- Strength Maintenance

- Unit Formation
- Unit Status Reporting
- Stabilized Tour Lengths of Organizations

Reenlistment

- COHORT reenlistment Options – Assigned regardless of ETS and stabilized using AEA code R
- COHORT reenlistment Options - #1 – Careerists whose ETS occurs prior to end of lifecycle
- COHORT reenlistment Options - #2 - Careerists whose ETS occurs prior to end of lifecycle may reenlist to meet OCONUS tour requirements
- COHORT reenlistment Options - #3 – If unwilling to extend/reenlist
- Reenlistment window
- Schools – Volunteering
- Personnel Actions
- Personnel Actions - Volunteering
- Officer Cadre Selection
- ANGCRI
- ETS – Level 1 – Soldiers within 7 days of ETS
- New Manning System Concept
- Deployment Support

Sustainable: (85)

- Reassignments
- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 3 – Reassignment on the installation
- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 4 – Initial Soldiers will not be assigned to a second UM organization
- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 5 – No assignment to a deploying unit with less than 24 months since returning from OCONUS
- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 6 – Grade of NCO/Time in Service
- Stabilization of tours
- Stabilization concept
- Unit formation – Levels of fill – Rule 9 – Officers in the Grade of 1LT(P) can be utilized in CPT positions
- Promotion to SGT
- Promotion to SSG
- Promotion to SFC
- Promotion to SGM
- Selection of Soldiers on AI

- Schools – Officers
- Schools – Enlisted
- Individual Augmentation
- Accession Requirements
- IET Package size floors
- Accession for low density MOS (less than 10 Soldiers)
- Utilization of SGT – Less than 5 years
- Utilization of SGT – Greater than 5 years
- Utilization of SSG – Less than 8 years
- Utilization of SSG – Greater than 8 years
- Utilization of SFC – Less than 14 years
- Utilization of SFC – Greater than 14 years
- Accelerated Advancement to E4
- Accelerated Advancement to E3
- Accelerated Advancement to E2
- Advancement to SPC
- Promotion Recommendation to SGT
- Promotion Recommendation to SSG
- Eligibility for SFC Promotion consideration
- Eligibility for MSG Promotion consideration
- Award promotion points (SGT/SSG) for traditional military education
- Promotion effect on Stabilization – Enlisted
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 2 – All SL1 will be provided by PERSCOM
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 3 – Fill of SL2-5 positions with SL1 is permitted
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 4 – SL1 Soldiers required to fill SL 2-5 vacant positions will be provided by PERSCOM
- Unit Formations – Levels of fill – Rule 5 – Soldiers in pay grade E-4 who are designated to serve in E-5 will be included in senior grade strengths as available
- Unit of Formations – Levels of fill – Rule 6 – Fill of SL2-5 will be accomplished in coordination with PERSCOM
- Unit of Formations – Levels of fill – Rule 7 – Normal grade substitution is permitted
- Units of Formations – Levels of fill – Rule 8 – AR 220-1 rules apply
- Cross Leveling of Initial Term Soldiers
- Requisitioning Enlisted Personnel
- Enlisted Cadre
- Enlisted Cadre – Stabilization
- Enlisted utilization

- NCO position substitution with first term Soldiers
- RCP
- Retirement following promotion to SGM
- Retirement following promotion to MSG
- Retirement following promotion to SFC
- Retirement following promotion to SSG
- Enlisted by-grade substitution Rule 1 – Allow for promotion growth
- Enlisted by-grade substitution Rule 2 – Grade determination
- Enlisted by-grade substitution Rule 3 – Select the highest grade NCO first
- Enlisted by-grade substitution Rule 4 – Installation required to make final selection of the support MOS to be assigned
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 10 – Maximum allowable officer shortages
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 11 – Officer requisitions
- Unit Formation – Levels of fill – Rule 12 – Officer fill levels are reflected as a % of MTOE authorizations
- Promotion effect on stabilization – Officers
- Branch Transfer Request
- Retirement following promotion to COL
- Retirement following promotion to LTC
- Retirement following promotion to MAJ
- Officer by-grade Substitution Rule 1 – Stabilize officers in the same manner as initial term Soldiers and NCO leaders
- Officer by-grade substitution Rule 2 – Commanders should be 1LT(P) or CPT
- Officer by-grade substitution Rule 3 – Consider service obligation and promotion status
- Officer by-grade substitution Rule 4 – Consider INDEF status for COHORT units
- Officer by-grade substitution Rule 5 – LTs must be deployable
- Personnel Actions – Joint domicile
- AEA Codes
- Enlisted Assignment System
- MOS 11X Accessions
- Personnel Actions – Deletions/deferments
- U.S. Army Replacement System Policy
- Regimental Affiliation Assignment Policy
- Personnel Actions – Exchange program
- Permanent Profile – Level 2
- Cross Leveling
- Unit Top off at Rotation – Rule 1 – Unprogrammed losses

- Unit Top off at Rotation – Rule 2 – Losing command responsibility to project losses
- Unit Top off at Rotation – Rule 3 – PERSCOM to provide top off package
- Leadership Tours

Status Quo: (51)

- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 1 – Selection criteria for leaders
- Enlisted Cadre – Rule 2 – Recently deployed Soldiers
- PERSTEMPO
- Personnel Actions – Pending Separation
- Personnel Actions – Compassionate
- Mode of Movement
- Attrition and recycles
- Personnel Actions – Conscientious Objectors
- Hometown Recruiter Assistance Program
- REQUEST
- Accession for low density MOS
- DEP Losses
- Leave following IET
- Personnel Actions – German Nationals/German Aliens
- Personnel Actions – Pending civil action
- Personnel Actions – Pending investigation
- Personnel Actions – Witnesses
- Personnel Actions – Profiles
- Personnel Actions – Threat to life
- Lautenberg Amendment
- OCONUS Tour lengths (if applicable)
- Stabilization from Repetitive Deployment
- Failure to be selected for promotion – Officers
- Requisitioning Officer personnel
- Career Field Designation
- Initial Entry Training Packages
- Personnel Actions – Extreme family problems
- Personnel Actions – EFMP
- Assignment Procedures
- Relief for Cause
- Regimental Affiliation Policy
- Personnel Actions – Assistance Enroute

- Deployment Standards
- Family Care Plan – Level 1
- Former POW – Level 2
- Peace Corps – level 2
- Sole surviving Family Member – Level 2
- Initial Entry Training – Level 2 – Soldiers who don't complete 12 weeks of training
- Pregnancy – Level 2
- HIV – Level 2
- Commanders Restriction –Level 3 - commanders may restrict movement of Soldiers
- Legal Affairs – Level 3
- Unit Movement Policy
- Mother of Newborn
- Adopted child
- Initial Term Accession – 19/11/13
- TDY limits
- Utilization
- IET for Combat Arms
- COHORT Unit Replacement System
- Reclassification

Note: The review of the 167 policy areas listed above has been ongoing since November 2003. There have been considerable reductions in the number of issues and some new issues have been developed. The final results are due 1 July 2004.

C - ANNEX C – STABILIZATION MANNING SYSTEM

1. Definition: Soldiers serve extended tours in the same BCT/MTOE unit or at the same installation. The goal is to stabilize Soldiers and families for as long as possible, moving them only to support requirements based upon 1) needs of the Army, 2) leader development, and 3) Soldier preference. Stabilization through company grade branch qualifying equivalents would optimize cohesion within the units. Soldiers attend professional development courses such as BNCOC and the Captain's career course and return. Following an initial "extended" tour, leaders are encouraged to serve repetitive assignments at their Stabilized installation or region unless they are required to depart for professional development or institutional Army requirements (no moves to same duty position at different posts).

2. The Model: Soldiers remain in their assigned CONUS installation for extended tours where reassignments are generated only support: (in prioritized order)

- a. Needs of the Army
- b. Leader development
- c. Soldier preference

3. Intent: Create more highly trained, combat ready, survivable units while providing increased stability and predictability to Soldiers, units, and families. This will be accomplished by providing more stability (reducing PCS moves) and predictability (better understanding of future training events and deployments) thereby creating more stable teams that train and stay together while minimizing unnecessary turnover each year. The building block (base units) on the installation for Stabilization is the BCT/UA. On non-divisional installations, MTOE units will serve as the building block (base units). Soldiers will select their initial assignments using a merit-based selection system with more transparency in the process that will determine their installation/location that will last an extended period. As Soldiers arrive at installations, every effort will be made to stabilize them within the installation BCT/UA/MTOE unit for an extended period through MOS or branch qualification. If they must be moved for force structure reasons as they are promoted, stabilizing them at the installation level is the next desired option, with movement within the region and finally other assignments as the final two options. In every circumstance, maintaining the BCT/UA/MTOE unit with the original core of Stabilized Soldiers is the default mechanism. Soldiers will arrive in Stabilized units at other than their initial entry period if 1) they elect to return from an OCONUS accompanied tour and a Stabilized unit has an imbalance, 2) they are at a CONUS installation that has a significant imbalance created by higher than normal attrition or unforecasted losses.

4. Implementation Rules (Initial transition from current policies to Stabilization): Because there are few changes to current policy on implementation of Stabilization except to designate stabilization installations and associate personnel with them, the phase-in in August 2004 will not be dramatic. Changes will be outlined by CONUS or OCONUS assignments.

a. CONUS Assignments – The vast majority of new initial term Officer spaces are in CONUS BCT's/UA's/MTOE units where the officers will gain valuable company grade MTOE experience. There will be some officers, especially from some specialty branches, that will require assignments to other than BCTs/UA's/MTOE units.

b. OCONUS Assignments (Unaccompanied) – Unit Rotations to Korea and incentives for extensions, will result in a significant reduction in the number of unaccompanied tours in the long run. Simultaneously as the unaccompanied OCONUS requirements begin to diminish due to increased rotations, so will the number of stabilized BCT/UA/MTOE units that are not lifecycled and are therefore available to supply Soldiers for a year tour and return without breaking up a lifecycled unit. Therefore, those company grade positions that remain will be handled on a modified PCS basis with orders processed by installation or HRC based upon names provided by the installation/BCT/UA/MTOE units that are not lifecycle manned and other remaining CONUS units. If names are not provided, HRC will select the appropriate numbers to fulfill the shadow installation obligation. Each installation will have a proportional share of positions/specialties required for the short tour locations that they must man. The slots will be coded with the Stabilized installation and the short tour position code. Soldiers will be sent to fill the positions overseas and then return to their Stabilized installation/unit (to be replaced by the next individual from that unit). Soldiers desiring unaccompanied tours for their initial assignment will select one of the Stabilized slots using the web-based selection process that offers the combination they desire. All Soldiers who select an unaccompanied tour first will be simultaneously selecting their Stabilized assignment (a slot that offers both must be available to them) since they are filling a specific unaccompanied space assigned to their Stabilized installation/unit. Families would be encouraged to move to the Stabilized assignment location and get settled prior to their spouse's departure. The key to this is that in the past, leaders and Soldiers within units desiring to maintain stability in their team/unit had an incentive to try to get their Soldiers deferred or deleted since HRC's recourse was to go back to the Army at large to select another replacement. Under this model, the unit has little incentive because it is zero sum game for them (they will have the same number away at all times), the only negotiable issue is the name associated with the tour. Soldiers beyond their Stabilized tour will rotate to unaccompanied tours as they currently do after receiving assignment orders from their branch managers. Exemption for lifecycle-managed units will cause additional burden on Stabilized units during transition period.

c. OCONUS Assignments (Accompanied). OCONUS tours to Europe and Hawaii/Alaska will degrade the benefits of the Stabilization model until unit rotations/deployments are instituted. OCONUS tours for company grade Soldiers will be manned for an initial tour of 3-4 years. They will be encouraged to attend their career course/BNCOC and then return to the overseas assignment if there is a position available offering career progression. If not, they will be reassigned to a CONUS unit in a BCT/UA if a position is available or if not, to an installation that offers a career progression position.

5. Implementation during the initial Transition Period.

d. CONUS Assignments – Some Soldiers will be required to fill vacancies left by OCONUS departures. First priority would be to send installation/TRADOC/TDA

Soldiers/Officers moving to OCONUS BCT's/UAs/MTOE units, second priority would be for Stabilized CONUS officers/enlisted who are over strength based upon force structure requirements at their next higher grade to be offered the opportunity to go to OCONUS positions. This destabilizes the CONUS brigades some, but also allows for a small portion of every "Stabilized" population the chance to change duty stations (personality conflict, EFMP situation, etc.) Volunteers could be solicited for this via web interface.

e. OCONUS Assignments. Soldiers cannot be extended involuntarily

1) Soldiers will be encouraged and provided incentives consistent with current extension incentives to remain for up to an additional 3-4 years. This is a significant change from the current maximum 1-year extension and may prove highly desirable. Incentives should be evaluated and modified to best match supply and demand.

2) Soldiers who choose to return to CONUS will fill 1) shortfalls in BCT/UA/MTOE unit inventory, 2) installation/TDA/TRADOC requirements

6. Implementation Guidelines at Steady State (where we should end up):

a. Accession

1) Officers

a) HRC is in the process of developing a web-based selection system.

When it is developed, ROTC/USMA/OCS will use a web-based selection system that combines elements of merit and preference to allow more transparency in how officers receive their 1) branch, 2) assignment location, and 3) entrance date on active duty. Every force structure billet for 2LT's including branch, location, and active duty date will be loaded onto an AKO accessed portal. Branch detail positions and IET/other Non-BCT/UA positions will be clearly marked so Cadets can also make decisions based upon the desirability of these options. Cadets receive dates (windows of days based upon their OML probably parsed into ~5-10% increments) to log in and select any available assignment package remaining. Each commissioning source receives a proportional share of assignments to insure commissioning diversity within units and installations. The intent is to provide officers more transparency in selecting their branch, unit, and installation, rather than the current system of preferences into a "black box" with results returned at a later date. Cadets left with few options in a real-time selection system based upon merit cannot blame the system for their result like they can in the current "black box" system. They can instead choose the best available professional and personal choice from the remaining options available to them. The key is that Soldiers and families are selecting from options rather than assignment managers trying to interpret small amounts of information and selecting for them. Even if the outcome is the same, having additional input will make the result more palatable. Cadets can now directly link their performance against a recognizable standard (academic standing, strength of school, basic and advanced camp evaluations etc.) with their order of selecting their branch, assignments, and active duty date.

b) CONUS Assignments – Same as Paragraph 4.a. above.

c) CONUS Assignments (Unaccompanied) – Same as Paragraph 4.b. above.

d) OCONUS Assignments (Accompanied) – The Army's Posture of Engagement will replace some overseas units with rotational unit. Rotations to Europe

and re-designation of Hawaii and Alaska as CONUS tours will minimize this issue. Remaining accompanied OCONUS tours for company grade Officers will be manned for an initial tour of 3-4 years. Officers will be encouraged to attend their career course and then return to the overseas assignment if there is a position available offering career progression. If not, they will be reassigned to a CONUS unit in a BCT or other MTOE unit if a position is available or if not, to an installation that offers a career progression position. Under no condition will they be reassigned to a CONUS BCT/UA/MTOE unit that will cause the core team from the BCT/UA/MTOE unit to be destabilized.

e) Branch Detail – Cadets who select a branch detailed position when making their accessions selections will move to that assignment as in the past. Every effort will be made to branch detail officers at an installation that has force structure to allow the transition to their basic branch with continued development within the BCT/UA, installation, or region.

2) Enlisted

a) Accession length – Accessed for any length of contract using MOS, unit/installation, and entry date as the primary drivers. Candidates are told that they will be stabilized at their selected installation for an extended period, with optimal cohesion and professional development achieved by stabilizing through company grade MOS qualification. When it is developed, prospective recruits should access a web-based system (the same one guidance counselors would look at) and can see what MOSs, units/locations, and start dates are available to them based upon their qualifications (ASVAB scores, once taken, are input into the database allowing the candidate to access the web under their SSN and view exactly what options are available (variables are MOS/unit/installation, and start date). Guidance counselors can still provide personal interaction to alleviate fears/concerns, but candidates feel like they are involved in the technical portion of the process. Recycling/delays at school/institutional base may result in loss of guaranteed position. HRC will attempt to accommodate wishes based upon other shortfalls, but guaranteed position is lost. Would use a new contract variation with intent to create stability for commanders if unit is deployed on an operational deployment.

(1) Contractual clause for extension during contingency deployment - The new VEL program is phasing in currently with some basic MOS to provide Accessions Command an opportunity to become fully acquainted with recruit concerns. It is anticipated that – All new contracts written would be for the VEL (training + a set period 24, 36, 48, 60, or 72 months) plus operational/contingency deployment +3 months with a max of 12 months total. This would solve the problem of a commander losing their trained team just prior to departure or while deployed. It is a “limited Stop Loss” based upon some DoD/Army/MACOM level authorization for units receiving deployment orders on a contingency operation. There would be an automatic 12-month limit to allow Soldiers to know that there will always be an end date for their enlistment. This would require a change in enlistment contracts and review by legal channels. An initial verbal review was conducted between DMPP and legal where issues were noted, but no revision or follow-up was made since Stabilization had not been approved at that time. This deserves significant attention with the approval of Stabilization.

(2) The Army is working to develop all initial (first 8 years) enlistment contracts with a clause that explains that all Soldiers enlist for a total of 8 years served

at least partially on active duty and in some cases the remainder in reserve status. As an example, this might be done by adding one year of “active reserve” obligation to all contracts such that it would only be invoked if the unit were alerted for or actively engaged in an operational deployment or contingency operation. This option is more akin to establishing a base/right to “immediately call-up” our transitioning Soldiers prior to their departure from active duty based upon some DoD level “trigger.” Again, this would have a maximum length of 12 months or contingency plus 3 months to ensure that Soldiers always have a finite end date. In both cases, this provides some measure of transparency to the process rather than what happened during Gulf War II (blanket Stop Loss/ Stop Move) that affected so many individuals – initially for an indefinite period.

b) OCONUS Assignments (Unaccompanied) – Unit Rotations to Korea and incentives for extensions, will result in a significant reduction in the number of unaccompanied tours in the long run. Simultaneously as the unaccompanied OCONUS requirements begin to diminish due to reduction of permanent forces OCONUS and subsequent increased rotations, so will the number of stabilized BCT/UA/MTOE units that are not lifecycled and are therefore available to supply Soldiers for a year tour and return without breaking up a lifecycled unit. Therefore, those company grade positions that remain will be handled on a modified PCS basis with orders processed by installation or HRC based upon names provided by the installation/BCT/UA/MTOE units that are not lifecycle manned and other remaining CONUS units. If names are not provided, HRC will select the appropriate numbers to fulfill the shadow installation obligation. Each installation will have a proportional share of positions/specialties required for the short tour locations that they must man. The slots will be coded with the Stabilized installation and the short tour position code. Soldiers will be sent to fill the positions overseas and then return to their Stabilized installation/unit (to be replaced by the next individual from that unit). Soldiers desiring unaccompanied tours for their initial assignment will select one of the Stabilized slots using the web-based selection process that offers the combination they desire. All Soldiers who select an unaccompanied tour first will be simultaneously selecting their Stabilized assignment (a slot that offers both must be available to them) since they are filling a specific unaccompanied space assigned to their Stabilized installation/unit. Families would be encouraged to move to the Stabilized assignment location and get settled prior to their spouse’s departure. The key to this is that in the past, leaders and Soldiers within units desiring to maintain stability in their team/unit had an incentive to try to get their Soldiers deferred or deleted since HRC’s recourse was to go back to the Army at large to select another replacement. Under this model, the unit has little incentive because it is zero sum game for them (they will have the same number away at all times), the only negotiable issue is the name associated with the tour. Soldiers beyond their Stabilized tour will rotate to unaccompanied tours as they currently do after receiving assignment orders from their branch managers. Exemption for lifecycle-managed units will cause additional burden on Stabilized units during transition period.

c) OCONUS Assignments (Accompanied) - Accompanied Tours (OCONUS) – rotations to Europe and re-designation of Hawaii and Alaska as CONUS tours will minimize this issue. Remaining accompanied OCONUS tours for company grade Enlisted Soldiers will be manned for an initial tour of 3-4 years. Soldiers will be

encouraged to attend their Basic NCO course and then return to the overseas assignment if there is a position available offering career progression. If not, they will be reassigned to a CONUS unit in a BCT/UA/MTOE unit if a position is available or if not, to an installation that offers a career progression position. Under no condition will they be reassigned to a CONUS BCT/UA/MTOE unit that will cause the core team from the BCT/UA/MTOE unit to be destabilized.

b. First tour assignments - The only inbounds to CONUS BCT's/UA's/MTOE units should be AIT/OBC graduates and those who selected an OCONUS unaccompanied tour tied to their Stabilized assignment.

c. First transition (steady state)

1) Branch Detailees – will transition from their detailed branch to the basic branch between 24-36 months either inside the BCT/UA/MTOE unit or more likely on the installation.

2) OCONUS Soldiers cannot be extended involuntarily in an OCONUS tour (small numbers)

a) Soldiers will be encouraged and provided incentives consistent with current extension incentives to remain for an additional 3-4 years. This is a significant change from the current maximum 1-year extension and may prove highly desirable. Incentives should be evaluated and modified to best match supply and demand.

b) If Soldiers choose to return CONUS, they will fill 1) shortfalls in BCT/UA/MTOE unit inventory, or more likely 2) installation/TDA/TRADOC requirements

3) CONUS Soldiers – First priority is to maintain the core team of Soldiers within BCT/UA/MTOE units. Soldiers may need to leave when excess to force structure, but the base team will remain in tact for the duration of their tour. Some CONUS soldiers will be required to fill vacancies left by OCONUS departures. First priority would be to send installation/TRADOC/TDA Soldiers/Officers moving to OCONUS BCT's/UAs, second priority would be for Stabilized CONUS officers/enlisted who are over strength based upon force structure requirements at their next higher grade to be offered the opportunity to go to OCONUS positions. This destabilizes the CONUS brigades some, but also allows for a small portion of every Stabilized population the chance to change duty stations (personality conflict, EFMP situation, etc.) Volunteers could be solicited for this via web interface.

4) Rules for releasing from BCT's/UA's/MTOE units (BCT/UA/MTOE unit stability is driver) –

a) Specialty assignments (SOF, EOD, RTB, OCS, etc.)

b) Force structure mismatches within the BCT/UAs are available for 1) installation needs, 2) TRADOC/TDA needs, 3) OCONUS needs

d. Professional Education cycle

1) PLDC – no change to current system – Soldier attends and returns to unit

2) BNCOC

a) CONUS - TDY and return

b) OCONUS

(1) If electing not to complete extended 1st tour in Europe, TDY enroute to CONUS assignment

(2) If electing to complete extended 1st tour, TDY and return (incentive provided)

3) Captain's career course – TDY & return or some kind of TCS that allows Officer to leave family with BAH/government housing at Stabilized installation, while allowing TDY/lodging at career course location.

7. Additional implementation issues

a. Using OML for accessions will result in officers in the lower portion of their peer group to be “force distributed” into less desirable posts ... and that these posts will then be populated with lower quality officers. The OML is an honest broker and will allow distribution according to merit and preference. Assuming that officers in the lower portion of their peer group are substandard officers assumes an absolute correlation between the OML criteria and future performance as officers. Most OML's (at least West Point's OML) is heavily weighted toward academics, which although predictive of graduation success from West Point, is not necessarily predictive of performance or longevity in the Army. An additional concern was the lack of diversity that may result given a pure merit/preference based selection system. A new methodology is being developed to control this by using a force distribution from the bottom ensuring that some options close around the 50% or so mark, thereby exacting the desired mix from the lower half of the cadets (again they would only see what is an option so ... still no black box spitting out their results).

b. Company/Battalion command lengths do not need to change under Stabilization.

c. Concern that leaders will protect officers and send only their less desirable officers to OCONUS unaccompanied tours. There will still be monitoring at installation/DA for repetitive assignments. Given a historic three year tour, there could be some concern about this, however, given the extended tour, each Soldier should expect to do a single unaccompanied OCONUS tour. This system should actually do a better job of preventing people from hiding and not accepting their fair share (unaccompanied tour).

d. Use proponents to help determine value in Stabilizing installations that have major pure units (Forts Sill and Lee as example).

e. Warrant Officers – additional analysis must be completed to determine if possible to Stabilize technical or aviation or within BCT's?

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Soldier	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased stability for all Soldiers, especially in initial tour• Slows down the force• Families Stabilized through short tour• Reduces # of PCSs over career• Continuity of community services (medical, dental, church, spouse college/career, schools)• Provides increased predictability (unit training & NTC cycles)• Synchronized to assignment oriented training (uses skills for extended period)• HS Stabilization compatible• Summer Cycle moves compatible• EFMP supportable• Allows flexible school start options – not inhibited by model• Better able to plan and attend civilian school• Position rotations adapted to professional development not model• Specialty assignments supported (SOF/Old Guard, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No improvement to OCONUS accompanied tours• Limits Soldiers' opportunity for external assignments (DS/Rec)• Post size could limit professional development• No BCT lock-in ... movement out could minimize predictability• Soldier reup options limited• No operational pause for leaders• Malutilization to support no move from installation• Increased family separation (TDY & Rtn schools)

Disadvantage Mitigation

- 1) OCONUS Long Tours - Problem mandating only 3-4 year tour will be addressed by implementing Unit Rotations to Europe and proposing to modify the current characterization of Hawaii and Alaska as OCONUS tours. In the near-term, emphasis will also be placed on offering/encouraging volunteers for back-to-back OCONUS tours ... providing incentives when necessary to better stabilize Soldiers CONUS and OCONUS.
- 2) Soldiers' external assignments limited – Soldiers would complete an extended tour optimally through MOS branch qualification, developing those fundamental company grade leadership skills necessary to “build” combat-ready Soldiers. This would require a higher percentage of SSG's serving as drill sergeants and recruiters rather than junior SGT's within their formative company grade years.
- 3) Installation size could limit professional development – Soldiers and Officers at small installations may have fewer professional development opportunities and hence may have a higher frequency of moves (less stabilization) than individuals at larger posts.

- 4) No BCT/UA/MTOE unit lock-in ... movement out could reduce predictability – Soldiers and officers are not “locked” in like in a lifecycle model. Despite expectations... predictability could really be minimized if force structure changes or pyramid hierarchical needs require personnel moves. Strength managers need to focus on maintaining the strength of the BCTs/MTOE units. Personnel should be moved only as a last resort to fill a valid requirement/authorization ... not just to cross-level.
- 5) Soldier re-enlistment options limited – Soldiers will be offered specialty volunteer recruiting options (SF, EOD, prime power, etc.) and current location. This may have some reenlistment implications that must be watched closely. It may also result in Soldier/Family happiness if they selected a Stabilized unit near a family or desired location that allows them to stabilize for extended periods without it being detrimental to their career.
- 6) No operational Pause for leaders – Soldiers often view attendance at BNCOC and the career course as an operational pause, a chance to catch their breath prior to resuming the emotionally demanding responsibilities associated with squad leader and command positions. Using a TDY and return model, Soldiers never really depart the unit and will tend to stay focused on the “known” training cycle and the same issues/problems/relationships that they had been involved with for their first three years in the assignment. There really is no break like if they were going to an unnamed unit. This is more of a negative perception than negative reality. Soldiers must focus on the benefits of their family being stabilized while they perform their TDY.
- 7) Mal-utilization to support “no move from installation” – There may be a tendency to maximize stabilization at the expense of mal-utilizing Soldiers in positions (two-up and one-down in grade and branch/MOS specificity).

Advantages

Unit

- Soldiers spend extended periods with unit and average > 3 years with peers (cascading)
- Results in specialized Soldiers (heavy vs. light)
- Unit deploys at 100%
- Source of commission evenly dispersed
- Reduces distracters from training time – teams together longer

Disadvantages

- Team built over extended periods
- OCONUS tour same as present – no additional cohesion
- PCS/ETS attrition while deployed
- Best case ~14% turbulence/year worst case 30%

Disadvantage mitigation

- 1) Team built over extended period – therefore cascading knowledge base rather than focused training cycle. Minimizing the number of PCS moves to support OCONUS long-tours and developing an atmosphere that fosters a desire to reenlist for the current unit/installation.
- 2) No additional cohesion in OCONUS tour – OCONUS law limitations result in no policy change that can guarantee improved stability, however, offering the option to Stabilize for a OCONUS tour, and providing incentives as necessary may increase OCONUS stability which in turn impacts CONUS stability
- 3) PCS/ETS attrition while deployed – ETS attrition could be completely mitigated by approval of the VEL option or the one-year “active reserve” option for operational contingencies. PCS attrition should NOT happen for initial term Soldiers/Officers. For those in follow-on tours, operational contingencies should result in a delay or revocation of any PCS orders.
- 4) Turbulence – Providing incentives to maximize reenlistments at BCT/installation level can further drive down “discretionary” turbulence. Remainder is ETS turbulence than can only be mitigated by synchronizing cycles either through cyclic or lifecycle manning.

Army

Advantages

- All brigades available
- Minimizes Army readiness peaks and valleys
- Modernization – no timing delays
- Fewer policy changes for implementation
- No “start-up” costs to implement
- Reduces on-going PCS expenses (no mid-tour PCS)
- Enables transition to Unit Focused Stability
- No new burdens on infrastructure
- Adaptable leader development – can change periods for depth vs. breadth
- No joint timing restrictions
- No change to command/CSM policies (curtailments/delays to support deployments)

Disadvantages

- Results in specialized Soldiers
- Retention risk

Disadvantage mitigation

- 1) Specialized Soldiers – this is a planned outcome of this Stabilization model. Whether it is a strength or a weakness is for leaders to decide.
- 2) Retention Risk – Necessary incentives need to be available to ensure that locations that are “less in demand” (harder to reenlist Soldiers to remain in place) can maintain the appropriate grade and MOS matches necessary.

Cultural

- Unit Centric!
- Depth better than breadth [HVY/LT]
- Web-based assignment selection
- Hawaii and Alaska as CONUS tour?
- Soldier choice reduced (Reenlistment options)
- Transition risk - Breaking faith with current force if applied retroactively


Model Dependencies

- 1) Career Course – TDY & Return; Leader Development Task Force;
- 2) To maximize Stability, need to have Officers attend in TDY and return status to allow Families to stabilize in one location for extended periods.
- 3) VEL Contract – with back end variable something like operational contingency +3 not to exceed 12 months DMPP/OTSG evaluating legality
- 4) One-year active reserve “option” on all enlistments – this would allow automatic activation for up to one year to meet operational contingency (DoD triggered) DMPP/OTSG
- 5) Unit Rotations – Model works in degraded format (less stabilization) until rotations commence for Korea and Europe. DMPP/G-3
- 6) OCONUS tours – change the characterization for Hawaii and Alaska tours from OCONUS to CONUS ... allowing increased stability for those locations. DMPP/DoD
- 7) Attrition Models – remain basically the same or improve
- 8) BRAC – post consolidation would only help strengthen the models

D - ANNEX D – LIFECYCLE MANNING SYSTEM

1. Definition. Lifecycle Unit Focused Stability synchronizes a Soldier’s tour of duty with a unit’s operational cycle. Imperatives of this model are to build better-trained and cohesive units and to maximize the deployability of the unit during its Ready phase. The types of units earmarked for LM are Brigade Combat Teams or Units of Action (BCT/UAs) and other MTO&E units where cohesion is paramount.

2. Lifecycle Model.



A lifecycle consists of three phases: Reset, Train, and Ready. The first phase is the Reset Phase. As the initiation of a unit lifecycle, this phase includes all actions that result in the appropriate number of Soldiers and leaders (and some equipment) being assigned to the unit with the correct skills and grades. **Note:** This Reset is not to be confused with the G-4/CES equipment reset program for returning OIF/OEF units but activities in SBCT, modularized BCT, and UA may occur simultaneously. At the conclusion of the previous 36-month lifecycle, this Reset Phase is repeated and results in the orderly transition of responsibility and accountability of all resources, personnel, and equipment. During this phase, units can expect a maximum of 30% to 40% of personnel to have the option to “roll-over” and remain in the unit due to promotions, ETSS, and force structure requirements. Incoming and outgoing personnel simultaneously conduct transition activities (HHG, CIF, in/out process, property and equipment transfer, etc). Ideally, changes of command occur during this phase as well. The incoming command team should arrive approximately 60 days prior to the conclusion of the Reset Phase, allowing for the orderly transition of responsibility. At the conclusion of this phase all outgoing personnel have departed, incoming units are 100% manned, and property accountability actions are complete. As the Reset activities are completed, the unit moves seamlessly into the Train Phase.

The second phase is the Train Phase. During this phase, in combination with the Reset Phase activities, units conduct a total of 6 months of focused training from individual through collective, culminating with a certification exercise (CERTX) that may be conducted during the Ready Phase at a Combat Training Center (CTC) or a major readiness exercise (MRE) in a local training area. As an example, during a Train Phase, an Armored BCT will accomplish selected/modified Mission Essential Task List (METL) training including: individual gunnery, crew gunnery, CALFEX, Platoon STX, Company STX, Company Exeval, Bn FTX, Bn CPX, Bde CPX, and Bde FTX. If the

BCT goes to a CTC during the Ready Phase, they will accomplish rail movement of equipment, execute the CTC, and rail movement to home station. If they do not travel to a CTC, they will conduct a BCT Pre-Exeval at home station, and the BCT Exeval at home station. At the end of the Train Phase and certification/validation, a unit is fully prepared to deploy to worldwide and conduct contingency combat operations. The Reset and Train Phases may be curtailed or extended from the six total calendar months depending upon requirements of GWOT and training constraints. During this phase and the certification/validation, units will **not** be tasked with installation support requirements, SD or BMM.

The third phase is the Ready Phase. This phase marks a 30 month period in which a unit is available for employment. During a Ready Phase, a unit can be scheduled for Deployment Ready Brigade (DRB) type missions and incorporated into FORSCOM's Personnel, Tasking, and Training Management System (PTTMS) for Divisional units, which outlines red, amber, and green cycles. Since personnel turbulence is significantly reduced, units can maintain higher levels of accretive training, either live, virtual, or constructive, and even participate in Joint operations for the duration of the lifecycle. Training continues during this phase specifically to sustain the high collective capabilities attained and validated in the Train Phase. Un-programmed personnel losses occurring during the Ready Phase are periodically replaced with personnel packages. Integration of new personnel occurs immediately following each package replacement and is solidified in the concurrent training conducted during this phase.

3. Managing Lifecycles. Managing lifecycle units requires close coordination and synchronization across virtually all Department of the Army and MACOM Staffs to ensure optimum levels of readiness and efficiency are achieved.

a. Timeline for building a unit under a Lifecycle model

Effective date minus 15 – 18 months: **Build the Bench.** Personnel planning begins. The unit, installation and Human Resources Command (HRC) will begin to identify personnel in the unit who want to remain for an additional cycle subject to the authorized positions, while other personnel are identified as candidates to move to the unit (either across the Army or from other units / organizations on post). A Web based assignment system using screening criteria to ensure Soldier/unit match will facilitate this process when fully implemented. HRC addresses specific individual and unit inquiries.

Effective date minus 15 months: **Build the Unit.** Automated system using business rules to assign volunteers and identify additional Soldiers to fill remaining personnel requirements. Assignments for enlisted Soldiers are based on projected grade by end of lifecycle. Officers can expect to serve in 1 or 2 positions during the Lifecycle, based on the Commander's determination of unit mission and officer professional development.

Effective date minus 12 months: **Notify Soldiers.** Soldier/unit receives RFO. OES/NCOES and/or assignment oriented or position-oriented training enroute is dictated on orders.

Effective date minus 6 – 12 months: **Monitor and Adjust.** SL10 Soldiers and Lieutenants in the training base and Soldiers requiring training enroute must be monitored to ensure training requirements are met prior to arriving to new unit.

Effective date minus 2 – 6 months: **Prepare and Move.** Soldiers and families out-process old units, attend training as required, take leave enroute and move to new installation.

Effective date minus 2 months: **Reset Phase.** New Leaders and Soldiers move into billets or quarters, draw regional TA-50 from CIF, sign for organizational equipment, and attend on-post schools (as needed).


Effective date plus 4 months: **Train Phase.** Individual, crew, and unit collective training at home station culminating with a CERTEX at a CTC or MRE. CERTEX may well be accomplished during the Ready Phase. The 4 months is optimum and may be extended or curtailed depending on requirements of GWOT and training constraints. Units do not fulfill installation support requirements.

Effective date plus 4 months to lifecycle end: **Ready Phase.** Unit conducts DRB type missions with a 6 – 12 month rotation to contingency operations. Additionally, units fulfill installation support requirements while conducting sustainment training and readiness levels commensurate with certified deployable units.

Last 1 – 3 months of cycle: Follow-on **Reset Phase:** Soldiers on PCS/ETS orders depart the unit. Soldiers who have volunteered and been identified to remain in the unit for the subsequent cycle assist in transfer of responsibility actions and mentor new Soldiers arriving.

4. Un-programmed Losses. Lifecycle units are formed with the presumption that all assigned Soldiers will remain with the unit for the duration of the cycle. However, un-programmed losses are expected to occur much as they do today. Un-programmed losses are due to unplanned events such as Soldier misconduct, physical disabilities, and death. When a unit loses key leaders, the unit commander will replace losses from within the unit. The exception is key positions (Maintenance Technicians, Chaplains, Supply NCO, NBC NCO, etc) where a replacement cannot be filled from within the unit. Under this circumstance, the unit submits an immediate fill requirement to HRC. The overarching benefit of internally replacing losses is that Soldiers can continually move into positions of increasing responsibility. A negative consequence is the creation of Skill Level 1 (SL1) vacancies.

Cohesion vs Turbulence *Assume PLT SGT is a loss*



Higher rates of un-programmed losses for high density MOS SL1 Soldiers in a lifecycle unit may require that SL1 replacements be infused into the unit at relatively frequent intervals (goal is annually but semi-annually will be considered). These replacements will come from Basic Training (BT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), or from other Army units. SL1 replacements must have sufficient time remaining in service and in grade to cover the remaining duration of the unit's lifecycle. Senior leader replacements (Commissioned and Noncommissioned Officers) will be filled annually for two reasons. First, this pool of key leaders is less likely to experience un-programmed losses. Secondly, replacements require extended lead times for identification, selection, and notification. Depending on the unit's location, if it cannot fill from within its ranks, it may be able to locally select replacements, and subsequently receive a back-fill from HRC. This method can decrease the time a lifecycle unit has an unfilled leader position.

a. **Accessions for Specialized Units.** Specialized Units will continue to recruit across the Army to fill their formations. Soldiers in lifecycle units can request permission to compete for acceptance into these types of units. However, given the unit-centric nature of a lifecycle unit, it is imperative to keep all Soldiers for the entire length of the cycle. Therefore, Soldiers who meet the screening criteria for acceptance into other Specialized Units will not be released until after the lifecycle has concluded. The only exception is Army Special Operations Forces.

b. **OCONUS Tours.** Long and Short overseas tour requirements will continue to be filled under the purview of HRC at the end of an operational cycle for eligible Soldiers.

c. **Transition from Lifecycle.** The intent during transition to lifecycle is to rebalance or redistribute Soldiers within each installation with Soldiers having 30-36 months availability for assignment to lifecycle units.

Steps:

- 1) Identify the force structure and authorizations.
- 2) Identify the inventory (Installation-wide).
- 3) Soldiers will be cross-leveled within the installation when feasible except:
 - a) Soldiers with a reenlistment prohibition.
 - b) Soldiers with an ETS date during the lifecycle (will not extend or reenlist).
 - c) Soldiers with PCS orders.
- 4) Count promotable Soldiers (and projected promotions) in the next grade.
- 5) Build units by maximizing the installation's inventory. Should be able to man most non-SL10 positions from installation inventory.

5. Advantages and Disadvantages.

Lifecycle

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Soldier	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stabilizes Soldiers and Families for duration of lifecycle • Improves predictability (published training events/deployments at least 12 months) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited assignment availability due to staggered unit scheduling • Less flexibility for professional development assignments (especially low density) • Challenges to Well-being Program (HS stabilization, summer cycle moves, etc.)
Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increases cohesion (horizontal & vertical) • Synchronized tour lengths for CDR, CSM • Entire unit deployable • Reduces personnel turbulence • Focuses training periods (initial & sustainment) • Supports unit rotations • Increases and lengthens readiness levels (potential higher "T" levels) • Reduces repetitive training due to personnel turbulence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit readiness below C-1 during reset and train phases • Turbulent reset phase for property accountability actions (outgoing/incoming transfer of responsibility)
Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No law changes anticipated for implementation • Increased depth of experience for leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation constraints impact implementation • Complex synchronization of accessions, schools, promotions, service obligations • LT/CPTs enter and fill without growing into positions • Less time available for field grades to achieve joint qualification • Potential for producing commission specific units (USMA, ROTC, etc) • Mix of Initial entry soldiers in Korea • Deployable units between 69 – 80% • Perception of "Have/Have nots"
Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit-Centric • Perception of "Have and Have-nots" • Equity – command opportunity • Managed readiness is acceptable 	

Disadvantage Mitigations.

a. **Soldier.**

1) **Limited assignment opportunities** – Under the steady-state LM model, no more than two BCTs per month will begin an operational cycle. Since a Reset Phase lasts 2-months, the number of choices available for a Soldier who would like to PCS to another lifecycle unit and/or installation is equal to the number of months in this phase. If all assignment options were available, a Soldier could choose one of the following:

- b. Remain with his or her current unit for another operational cycle.
- c. Remain at the installation and move to another BCT that is scheduled to begin an operational cycle within 60 days.
- d. Move to another installation and into a BCT scheduled to begin a lifecycle within 60 days. This can be expanded by attendance at required Assignment oriented or Position oriented TDY enroute courses as necessary for the next unit and projected position.
- e. PCS to a Specialized unit, an Institutional Army organization including Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, AC/RC or Joint.

1) **Attendance at Professional Development (PD) courses** – Currently unit commanders enjoy great latitude for sending Soldiers to OES/NCOES courses. In most instances, Soldiers are afforded the opportunity to attend schools when time is available and no deployment contingencies are scheduled. This degree of flexibility could significantly decrease for lifecycle units if Soldiers are not allowed to attend professional development or position-oriented courses within the unit's training or ready phase. A possible remedy is to keep the professional development school attendance decision-making authority in the "Commander's Box" but within specified guidelines. Commanders of lifecycle units can determine when to send Soldiers to school providing that they are present for key training events and deployments.

2) **Challenges to the Army's Well-Being Plan** – Reset Phases at steady state for lifecycle units will be staggered across an entire calendar year which will inherently cause PCS moves to occur during every month of the year. Consequently, some Soldiers and families may not benefit from all aspects of the Army's Well-Being Plan including benefits such as summer moves and stabilization of Soldiers with HS seniors. Mitigating this potential issue can be done in the same manner as today where personnel managers at all levels are working case-by-case with Soldiers to find the best possible solution for well-being issues.

f. **Unit.**

1) **Decreased Unit Readiness Levels during Reset and Train Phases** – Current unit readiness is heavily based on the CSA policy that requires all Army units to be manned at 100 percent and that all units are available for deployment at any time. One factor considered in determining readiness is the subjective determination by unit commanders regarding the level of training their unit has achieved. This factor coupled with an incremental turbulence level between 15 and 30 percent annually in all units across the Army would indicate that current readiness levels are perhaps much less than 100 percent. Lifecycle units will obviously start at lower readiness levels because all leaders and Soldiers arrived during the 2- month Reset Phase. However, by the end of the 4-month Train Phase a lifecycle unit's readiness level is comparable to today's IRS units. Moreover, lifecycle units can continue to build on collective capability, readiness, and lethality for the next 30-months because of the small number of un-programmed losses that will occur, projected at 5 – 7 percent. The key take-away from

a readiness perspective is that lifecycle units are better trained with increased stability, readiness, and cohesion for approximately two complete years following the conclusion of the Training phase.

2) **Property Accountability during Reset Phases** – Transfer of responsibility of property from outgoing units to incoming units will be very challenging for a lifecycle unit. The most critical factor is time, with only 2-months to accomplish essential property accountability tasks before outgoing Soldiers leave and incoming Soldiers begin training. Optimally, having both outgoing and incoming units present would decrease the amount of time needed for commanders, supply sergeants, and sub hand-receipt to complete inventories and sign over all property. However, installation constraints may preclude this from happening. At a minimum, outgoing and incoming commanders, supply sergeants, and all outgoing sub hand-receipt holders must be present until all property accountability actions (reports of survey, statements of charges, etc) are complete and the incoming commander signs the property book thus accepting responsibility for the unit's property. The property is then secured until the remainder of the incoming unit arrives upon which another inventory is conducted to allow the incoming commander to properly sub hand-receipt his or her property.

g. **Army.**

1) **Installation Constraints Impact Implementation** – Limiting factors for implementing a lifecycle model Army-wide are current and projected infrastructure and resource constraints at installations. Increased numbers of Soldiers (doubled in some cases) who are transitioning in and out of units will create significant challenges to installations regarding transportation (HHG), Central Issue Facilities (TA-50), Housing, and so on. Although there is some flexibility in the amount of transition time that will take place (1 – 2 months), it is essential to complete the Reset Phase in the shortest time possible thus minimizing the impact on readiness timelines and burdens placed on Soldiers and families. The Army Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) / Installation Management Agency (IMA) has the lead in this effort.

2) **Complex Synchronization of Accessions / Service Obligations, Promotions, and Schools** – Lifecycle units are dependent on several key proponents that require a collaborative effort to synchronize.

h. Accessions must be able to sustain current force requirements, particularly with lengths of service obligations required to meet lifecycle lengths. Lead is Accessions Command.

i. Promotions and career maps for Soldiers revised to align with lifecycle standard. Personnel proponents will have to update career maps to align to LM.

j. OES/NCOES modifications may be required to provide graduates to units in the monthly Reset Phases of an Army-wide lifecycle schedule. Lead is TRADOC in coordination with Army G-3. Requires:

k. Multiple graduation dates annually for ILE and Sergeants Major Academy to support manning requirements for majors and sergeants major in lifecycle units.

l. Non-resident phase of designated courses consists of common core topics completed through distance learning and resident phase focused on tactical and technical subjects.

m. Unit commander retention of flexibility to determine when to send Soldiers to courses during lifecycle periods when missions and schedules allow.

1) **Professional development challenges for Lieutenants and Captains** – Battalion and brigade commanders who select officers for key positions based on performance and potential have historically managed the professional development and growth opportunities for company grade officers. In combat arms units, company XO and specialty platoon positions are usually reserved for Lieutenants deemed to have the most potential in a battalion. In a Lifecycle unit Brigade Commanders will be able to earmark their top performers for company command and send them to the career course and return. Most Lieutenants will enter key leadership positions directly from basic courses with little or no previous experience. Branch detailed officers will remain the entire length of the Lifecycle. Some Captains will be assigned directly from the career course.

2) **Joint Qualification for Field Grade Officers** – With the duration of tours in lifecycle units mandated at 36 months for all assigned personnel, the average amount of time available for field grade officers (MAJ – COL) to achieve joint qualification would decrease by 12 – 24 months. Partial mitigation for a portion of these officers (or for those selected to serve in joint positions) is to allow for 24-month command tours for Brigade and Battalion Commanders, and 12 – 24 month branch qualification time for majors serving in lifecycle units that do not deploy and 36-month tours for those serving in units that do deploy. While this would provide selected field grade officers who serve in joint positions the requisite amount of time to complete a joint tour, it would reduce the continuity and cohesion capability of the command team.

3) **Producing Commission Specific Units** – Army officer commissioning source outputs are not synchronized with the monthly Reset Phases of lifecycle units across the Army. Consequently, sources, such as the United States Military Academy (USMA), that provide commissioned officers annually may create the potential for all USMA units. The same can be said for ROTC and OCS officers. This issue will be mitigated in HRC by ensuring that lieutenants from all commissioning sources continue to be distributed evenly across the Army, but with optimum consideration for lifecycle schedules. The result is that all installations would receive a fair share of officers from all commissioning sources for immediate or subsequent assignment to a lifecycle or other unit.

4) **Initial Entry Soldier Mix in Korea** – The number of initial entry Soldiers assigned to Korea will increase at steady state. The primary reason is that the annual turnover creates a greater demand for Soldiers than are available in the active force because most experienced Soldiers would be locked in for a complete cycle in a lifecycle unit. Rotating entire units to Korea best mitigates this issue. As Lifecycle is phased in across the Army, this issue may increase in importance for those MOSs with extremely high percentage of their force in the maneuver brigade combat team portion of the Army.

5) **Deployable units between 69 – 80 percent availability** – Current unit readiness metrics are based on the precept that every MTO&E combat unit will be fully manned, trained, and available for employment to world-wide contingency operations at all times (C-1 under AR 220-1). In the Lifecycle model, between 65-80% of units would be available at any given time. The remaining 20-35% percent would be available incrementally over the next 6-8 months. However, viewing these factors from the reality of constrained strategic lift capabilities and finite fort-port-port throughput provides

reasoning that concludes it would take at least 6 months to move ready units (80%) to a theater of operations thus providing sufficient time for the remaining units (20-35%) to complete training and prepare for deployment. Therefore, given a prudent mobilization timeline, an initial shortfall in ready, deployable units does not preclude our ability to deploy all active Army combat forces if necessary.

6. Model Enhancement. The Lifecycle Model will be considerably enhanced by two fundamental computer-based applications in order to achieve an optimum level of performance at steady state. First, a web-based assignment program is being designed by HRC that will provide a Soldier with a list of Lifecycle units that are entering a Reset Phase that he or she meets the criteria to join. Factors considered for qualification are the current or projected skill level the Soldier will achieve during the Lifecycle and the length of the Soldier's current contract. This capability is essential for both accessions and retention by allowing Soldiers to review their options with their career counselor, family, or mentor before making their final decision. Moreover, Soldiers should also be able to preview potential assignments by projecting reenlistment contracts by number of years (up to 3). Secondly, HRC and installation personnel managers will continue to have the capability to oversee the web-based systems from two vantages, individual Soldier and Unit Identification Codes. The former provides personnel managers the ability to review individual Soldier options. The latter provides the ability to determine manning requirements and shortfalls in order to anticipate a lifecycle unit's personnel needs.

E - ANNEX E – CYCLIC MANNING SYSTEM

1. Definition. Cyclic manning is focused on Headquarters elements and low density/high impact units that require continuous capability. Cyclic is the most effective method for sustaining units, but not necessarily the most effective in building cohesive, high performing units. Leader and Soldier assignments are done as a package and synchronized with the sustain period; this will normalize the training cycle for the unit. Cyclic focuses personnel turbulence to a scheduled one to two month period and replaces 15-30% losses. Unit cohesion and readiness improve with minor infrastructure challenges.

The Cyclic Model



2. Intent. The Cyclic model is comprised of two phases, Sustain and Ready. The Cycle length is the period from the beginning of one Sustain phase to the beginning of the subsequent Sustain phase. While this period could range between 9 to 24 months, the ideal value is 12. The overall concept of this model is to produce a stable, cohesive, and more deployable unit. Cyclic results in losses ranging between 10-30%, but is more suited for units where continuity of operations is paramount. Cyclic combines features of Lifecycle and the IRS.

Model Rules

a. Identification

- 1) Soldiers will be assigned to the unit under the expectation of remaining in the unit for 3 or 4 cycles based on their individual enlistment or reenlistment contract. (e.g., if Cycle is 12 months, Soldiers will be assigned for three or four year tours)
- 2) Command tours will be 2 cycles and changes of command will be aligned to occur during Sustain phases.
- 3) Discretionary professional development moves within the unit will be focused to occur during the Sustain phases to the maximum extent possible.
- 4) Soldiers who re-enlist for present duty will only be offered extensions in multiples of the cycle length so their future decision points will align to Sustain phases. When re-enlisting for present duty, consideration must be given to promotion potential. If the Soldier is likely to promote during the reenlistment period, the unit should assign the Soldier against a valid, empty authorization in the next grade.
- 5) No limiting profiles that would prohibit Soldier from deploying with their unit.

b. How assigned

1) HRC will make assignment. When developed, web based system will allow Soldiers to select the unit based on the location. HRC has the ability to override based on the needs of the Army.

2) Gains and programmed losses are scheduled to a compressed time period, every 12 months. Unprogrammed losses will occur across the cycle but these losses will be replaced by gains during the Sustain phase.

3) Orders to the unit will read "Report Not Later Than" the last day of the Sustain phase. Early reporting will be authorized.

4) Maximize the use of TDY enroute as necessary for professional development of Soldiers prior to their assignment. Soldiers who require professional development schooling while assigned to a cyclic unit can attend TDY and return based on unit mission.

c. How developed

1) Develop an automated system that screens out Soldiers not qualified to serve in this type of unit either because a valid authorization is ready to be filled, or the Soldier's availability does not align with the unit's need.

d. Sustain Phase

1) Units may be called upon to deploy during the Sustain Phase. Soldiers and officers will remain and deploy with the unit. Soldiers and officers will not leave the unit within 90 days of deployment.

2) Offer monetary incentives (as necessary by installation) for remaining with current unit for subsequent cycles (again in multiples of cycle length).

3) Soldier has choice to opt into unit not scheduled for deployment within the next 12 months. This will be the opportunity to request professional development assignment to the institutional Army.

4) Soldiers who wish to volunteer for nominative assignments may do so at anytime, but their actual departure from the unit will be aligned to a Sustain phase. The first O6 Commander can waive the timing of these discretionary moves, but replacement for a Soldier lost will occur at the next Sustain phase.

3. Additional Model Rules

a. The long-range vision of the cyclic model is that units will continue to run on cycles. The approximate duration of the cycle could be 12 months. During the sustain phase Soldiers would be identified for assignment to the unit. They would train together and prepare for the ready phase, which could be for a 12 months.

b. Exceptions to the rules will always occur. Normal attrition to the unit will continue i.e., medical discharges, chapters, and any other administrative release. These losses are referred to as unprogrammed losses. Based on historical averages, an MTOE unit should realize less than 8% of these losses annually. The only organizations that will be permitted to recruit from the unit will be the SOF, Old Guard. OCONUS short tour selections will continue to occur until a rotation policy is established, but departure will be aligned to the Sustain phase so replacements are available.

a. Transitioning to this model will be less painful than the complete reset required in the lifecycle model. Far fewer policies will need changing. Around the 36-month mark,

the unit should reach steady state. There will be annual windows for professional development attendance. The annual reset builds teamwork and cohesion on a 12-month cycle;

<h1>Cyclic</h1>	
Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>Soldier</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual 3-year stability in BCT (some flexibility in annual phases) • Improved predictability (published training and deployment schedules) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual professional development opportunities • Training readiness linked to annual cycles • Reduced assignment choices (only 3 BCTs per month)
<p>Unit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual cohesion (horizontal & vertical) • >90% of BCTs available • Increased deployability during ready phase • Focused sustainment training periods • Moderate readiness gains • Less changes required for implementation • Less delay for professional development attendance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synchronization of replacements with sustain period
<p>Army</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate readiness gains • Less changes required for implementation • Less delay for professional development attendance • 24 month BN & BDE command tours supportable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complex scheduling implications • Limited installation resources impact implementation • Operational employment of unit is limited to cycle • 20/30% turnover of unit in one month versus throughout the year

Mitigating Policies

- Training readiness linked to annual cycle. The readiness rates of the unit will fluctuate based on the cycle; leaders must expand METL tasks to find ways to ensure training does not become repetitive.
- Reduced assignment choices – based on a force of 33 brigades and optimal dispersion of Sustain phases, only 3 brigades will be entering the Sustain phase in any given month restricting a Soldiers choice of assignment. When this number of BCTs is increased to 48, Soldiers will be less restricted. More Liberal use of leave, TDY enroute courses and early reporting allow assignment managers to expand the number of brigades by a factor of 2 or 3. Offer monetary incentives to opt into a unit that is scheduled for deployment within the next 12 months; this will increase stability if Soldiers stay for multiple cycles.
- Synchronization of replacements with the sustain period. The Human Resources Command must closely manage replacement packages with the sustain period.

This will require assignment personnel to be vigilant in their efforts. Additionally, local personnel managers will have to keep Soldiers intended for a unit in the Sustain phase targeted to that unit and not “cross-level” these Soldiers to other units especially other Cyclic units.

- Complex scheduling implications. Schools managers must continue to ensure all Soldiers requiring NCOES schooling are scheduled in a timely manner; taking into account what phase the unit is currently in.
- Limited installation resources impact implementation. Provide additional funding to the installation to assist with resource shortages.
- Operational employment of the unit is limited to the length of the cycle. Scheduling must account for return of the unit prior to entering the Sustain phase. Policy adjustments are in the works to extend Soldiers, if operationally necessary, to complete an extended operational tour. The replacements planned for an extended cyclic unit would continue to arrive, and the installation would have to assume responsibility for these Soldiers until the conclusion of the deployment.
- 15/30 % turnover of unit in one month versus throughout the year. This planning factor will be reduced as Soldiers re-enlist for present duty, and incentives can be used to make present duty more enticing.

Cultural Changes

The CM model will require far fewer cultural changes to implement than LM. The first change will be that units will not always be filled to 100%; however the sustain period will only last for possibly one month. Commanders and Leaders will have to focus their efforts to the integration of new Soldiers once every cycle. All personnel remaining in the unit will have the mission to indoctrinate and support the new members, to rapidly rebuild collective capabilities. While a Cyclic unit has a predictable window of turbulence, many will not be aligned with the school year, and likely will result in a negative impact on Well-Being programs.

Model Dependency

When eHRS is implemented, HRC will adjust the assignment satisfaction key (ASK), a web-based system that will allow Soldiers to access the assignment system, search for and opt into a unit. All this must take into account Soldier qualifications. Final assignment decisions will be made by HRC.

F - ANNEX F – GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accretive Training – Training that builds in complexity and difficulty on previous training and that requires development of additional skills and unit capabilities.

Area of Concentration (AOC) – A requisite area of officer expertise (subdivision) within a branch or functional area.

Attrition – Personnel losses to the Army and units under consideration due to medical, indiscipline, or separation.

Bonding – The process of molding a group of Soldiers and their leaders into a cohesive, synergistic combat force. Bonding is a function of stability, shared experience, mutual confidence, trust, and common values. Force Stability initiatives consider three types of bonding activities:

- **Horizontal Bonding** – The bonding of peers into a cohesive, synergistic group whose members share common values, goals, and attitudes.

- **Organizational Bonding** – The synergistic process of building a cohesive unit through focused leadership and meaningful collective training activities leading to Soldier identification with the values of his unit and the Army.

- **Vertical Bonding** – The bonding of junior Soldiers, NCOs, and leaders through all levels of the chain of command.

Branch – A grouping of officers that comprise an arm or service of the Army in which an officer is commissioned, assigned, developed, and promoted through their company grade years. Officers are accessed into a single branch designation throughout their career unless transferred. (AR 600-3 and DA PAM 600-3)

Build Phase – The requisite activities accomplished over a period of time in a Lifecycle model that leads to the assembling of all personnel at the appropriate time and location to form a unit. The Build phase concludes with Organization Day. (Rescinded Term – replaced by Reset Phase)

Career Field – A grouping of functionally related commissioned officer, warrant officer, civilian, and enlisted positions under a single agent for life cycle personnel management purposes.

Certification Day (C-day) – The day the capstone certification event concludes and the unit is certified as “ready”, this event ends the Train phase and begins the Ready phase.

Cohesion – The subjective knowledge and experiences gained by a group who have bonded which allows them to operate in a more efficient and effective manner. Members of a cohesive group anticipate actions of other members or of the collective group with less need for direct communication.

- **Horizontal Cohesion** – Cohesion among peers.

- **Vertical Cohesion** – Cohesion across ranks from Soldier, through NCO to leaders at all levels of the chain of command.

Cyclic Manning - A Unit Focused Stability system for units where the unit operational schedule / timeline consists of a 1 or-2 month Sustain phase followed by 11 or-10 months, respectively in an annual cycle, of Ready phase. All Soldiers are assigned and depart during the Sustain phase. All position changes also occur during the Sustain phase. Upon assignment, Soldiers are stabilized to the unit for 36 months with the expectation they will complete a full tour.

Deployment – The process by which a unit departs its home installation to accomplish an assigned mission as part of a planned unit rotation or in response to an operational requirement.

Employable – A unit that has achieved a level of readiness (i.e., C1) and has been certified, enabling it to perform its Mission Essential Tasks.

Employment Phase – The period of time in a Lifecycle Model that the unit is combat ready and available for deployment to meet Army mission requirements worldwide. (Rescinded Term – replaced by Ready Phase)

Experiment – The process of testing a possible solution or mechanism. Experiments generally do not move to wider incorporation, rather successful portions of an experiment are further refined in a Pilot or Prototype.

First Term – A Soldier serving his/her initial enlistment contract.

Force Stabilization – A term, which encompasses both Stabilization and Unit Focused Stability concepts. Unit Focused Stability, formerly referred to as Unit Manning, includes the two conceptual management processes Lifecycle and Cyclic.

Friction – A measure of inefficiency in the assignment of personnel to authorizations. Force Stabilization initiatives consider three types of friction:

- **Malutilization** – Assignment of a Soldier to a position for which he/she is not qualified IAW DA Pam 611-21.

- **Over strength** – Assignment of personnel in excess of 100% authorized strength.

- **Understrength** – Failure to provide a unit with 100% authorized strength.

Functional Area – A grouping of officers by technical specialty or skill, which usually requires significant education, training, and experience. (AR 600-3 and DA PAM 600-3)

Grade Band – Range of grades covered by a procedure, policy, or action.

Individual Replacement System (IRS) – A personnel replacement mechanism which allows an individual to be assigned to a unit at any time in order to maintain the unit at a target percent fill.

Institutional Domain – The institutional Army (schools and training centers) is the foundation for lifelong learning. It develops competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders and Soldiers able to succeed in situations of great uncertainty. The institution provides the framework to develop future leadership characteristics that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility.

Leader Development – The deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in Army values, which grow soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the life-long synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the developmental domains of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development.

Leader Training – Leader training is the expansion of basic Soldier skills that qualifies Soldiers to lead other Soldiers.

Lifecycle Model – A Unit Focused Stability process that takes both the unit and its assigned Soldiers through three phases: Reset, Train, and Ready. The duration and policies that govern each phase may vary by unit and mission. The Reset Phase encompasses the processes, which initiate and conclude each iteration of the Lifecycle. Initiation actions include all actions that result in Soldiers and leaders being individually developed and collectively assigned to the unit. The Reset phase concludes with the Organization Day (O-day) event. The O-day marks the seamless transition of the unit to the Train Phase. During this phase, the unit focuses on collective training. The Training Phase concludes with a capstone training event that certifies the unit is ready for employment (or not). The conclusion of the certifying event is called the Certification day (C-day). The certification event may be conducted during the early stages of the Ready Phase. Upon certification, the unit focuses on sustainment training and is mission capable and ready for deployment as necessary by higher headquarters. The Ready Phase concludes with the Release Day (R-day), the day the unit is pulled off mission status, and to be replaced by the next iteration. The Reset phase, which begins with R-day, concludes the current iteration when all Soldiers and leaders have been either reassigned or separated from the unit and all property turned over. Concurrent with the concluding events of the current iteration, the Reset phase is initiating the next iteration to begin their training and assume the mission.

Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC)– Training environments involving the use of simulations and simulators that provide repetitive, iterative, intense, commander/leader, battle staff, unit and Soldier experiences required to achieve and sustain proficiency on critical wartime tasks.

Managed Readiness – A tiered readiness system based not on resources but on availability of forces. Units not in the planned down portion of a FS cycle, or not undergoing transformation, are considered available.

Mission Essential Task List – A compilation of collective mission essential tasks an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its wartime mission(s).

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) – Primary method used to identify the specific requirements of a position and requisite qualifications for Soldiers and Warrant Officers.

Operational Domain – Soldier and leader training and development continue in the unit. Using the institutional foundation, training in organizations and units focuses and hones individual and team skills and knowledge. The goal of unit training is to develop and sustain the capability to deploy rapidly and to fight and win as part of a combined arms team in a variety of joint operational environments. Unit training consists of three components: collective training that is derived directly from METL and MTPs, leader development that is embedded in the collective training tasks and in discrete individual leader focused training and individual training that establishes, improves, and sustains proficiency in tasks related to unit METL.

Organization Day (O-Day) – The day during unit lifecycle when all assigned personnel arrive and the unit is ready to begin individual and collective training resulting in unit proficiency.

Package Replacements – A personnel replacement mechanism in which a number of individual replacements are provided to a unit at a single time to bring the unit back to a targeted level of assigned strength.

Pilot – A test of a complete system or model in order to validate feasibility and identify problems. A pilot tests a prototype, which generally results from prior experimentation. Successful prototypes are typically developed for wider use.

Plug Replacements – A personnel replacement mechanism that provides fully trained sub-elements (Company, Platoon, Squad, Team, etc) to a unit to bring it back to target strength. The plug should remain together as a bonded sub-element of the unit.

Professional Military Education – PME develops Army leaders. Officer, warrant officer, and NCO training and education is a continuous, career-long learning process that integrates structured programs of instruction – resident at the institution and non-resident via distributed learning at home station. PME is progressive and sequential, provides doctrinal foundation, and builds on previous training, education, and operational experiences. PME provides hands-on technical, tactical, and leader training focused to ensure leaders are prepared for success in their next assignment and higher-level responsibility.

Readiness – Capability of the unit to perform its assigned mission based on all components of equipment, personnel, and training.

Ready Phase – The period of time in a Lifecycle or Cyclic Model that the unit is combat ready and available for deployment to meet Army mission requirements world-wide.

Release Phase – The process of reassigning or separating some or all of the Soldiers assigned to a Lifecycle Model Unit. (Rescinded Term – replaced by Reset Phase)

Release Day (R-day) – The day, during a Lifecycle managed Unit Focused Stability unit, which denotes the end of the Employ Phase and initiates actions necessary in the Reset Phase.

Replacement Mechanisms – The processes by which losses are replaced within the unit under consideration. The three mechanisms considered for this study are Individual Replacements, Package Replacements, or Plug Replacements.

Replenishment Period – A generic term that covers the replacement of personnel in a Unit Focused Stability unit. For a Lifecycle managed unit, it covers both the building of units as well as the package replacement of unprogrammed losses. In Cyclic managed units, it covers the Sustain phase.

Reset Phase – The requisite activities accomplished over a period of time in a Lifecycle managed unit that leads to the assembling of all personnel at the appropriate time and location to form a unit, as the unit lifecycle is initiated. The initial activities of the Reset phase conclude with Organization Day. As the Lifecycle iteration is concluding, the Reset phase accomplishes all the transition activities between the outgoing and incoming unit. Essential tasks include the transfer of responsibility of responsibility for all property and resources to the personnel assigned to the incoming unit (a limited number of personnel will remain from one iteration to the next and can guide this transfer). The concluding efforts of the Reset phase are complete when all property, resources, and personnel have been accounted for and transferred.

Soldier Lifecycle – The progression of an individual through the eight lifecycle functions of structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development and separation.

Slice Element – A sub-element, which is provided to a higher-echelon pure unit to build a multi-capable unit. For example, an ADA company of an ADA battalion is “sliced” to an Infantry Brigade as part of a brigade combat team.

Stabilization – A Force Stabilization initiative which assigns individuals to their initial (first) unit and stabilizes them at that installation for an extended initial tour; When possible, the Soldier should remain in one unit for the entire extended initial tour. If the Soldier is sent on a hardship tour during this initial extended tour, the Soldier will be returned to the same installation. Stabilization will be focused on CONUS installations which house one or more maneuver combat brigades, and later expanded as possible.

Stabilized Interval – The period of time during which no personnel are assigned to the unit under consideration. This period of time varies with each manning model and mechanism for handling losses.

Sustain Phase – The phase of a Cyclic managed unit during which all programmed losses occur and newly assigned replacements arrive to replace all programmed and unprogrammed losses, bringing the unit back to its target level of assigned strength. The unit's focus during this period is transitioning of the Soldiers leaving the unit, realignment of those Soldiers remaining in the unit, and integrating the newly assigned Soldiers. Historically, unprogrammed losses average between 5 – 8%. Based on this average, projections of 20-25% of the unit will be programmed as losses each Sustain phase (losses), resulting in 25 – 33% of the unit being newly assigned to the unit at the conclusion of the phase.

Turbulence – Reassignment of an individual from their assigned duty position.

- **External Turbulence** – Movement of an individual from their assigned duty position due to actions or processes beyond the control of the unit commander.

- **Internal Turbulence** – The movement of an individual from their assigned duty position due to actions or processes under the control of the unit commander.

Turnover – The loss of an individual to the unit under consideration. Attrition is a subset of turnover.

Unit Focused Stability (UFS) – A manning process that reduces turbulence within a unit by synchronizing personnel assignments to the operational cycle of the unit. Soldier arrivals and departures of personnel occur in specific scheduled periods thereby allowed the unit to focus on integrated the new Soldiers and building or sustaining combat capability and readiness. Two manning methods under Unit Focused Stability are Lifecycle and Cyclic.

Unit Managed Readiness – The readiness of the unit tied to the phase or cycle of unit under a Unit Focused Stability paradigm.

Unit Manning – A manning process that reduces turbulence within a unit by synchronizing some portion of the unit's arrivals and departures of personnel. (Rescinded Term – replaced by Unit Focused Stability.)

Unit Rotation – A process through which a unit periodically assumes a mission away from home station.

Variable Enlistment Length (VEL) – The time that is added to the initial enlistment contract that enables the Soldier to complete their training outside of their enlistment window of 3, 4, 5, or 6 years. The total contract will be for the enlistment period plus individual training in particular MOS.